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PREFACE 
During discussions with Department of Trade and Industry 
representatives in May 1983, it was suggested that there was a need to 
critically examine the available alternative marketing systems for 
agricultural products. This was considered to be especially important 
in view of the possible introduction of new market organisation systems 
in the New Zealand horticultural sector. As a result of the 
discussions, a research contract was entered into between the 
Agricultural Economics Research Unit and the Department of Trade and 
Industry. The intention of the research was to provide a review of the 
types of marketing systems used for various products and to make a 
preliminary assessment of their relevance to the New Zealand situation. 
This Discussion Paper provides the literature review that was 
undertaken for the project. A summary of the main literature findings 
is presented. 
TWo Research Reports (Numbers 173 and 174) are also published 
on this subject. These present further material on the analysis of the 
possible market structure arrangements, with special reference to the 
horticultural sector. Together with this Discussion Paper, the three 
publications constitute a useful compilation of material on this 
important question and form the basis for further specific product 
studies. 
(v) 
RG Lattimore 
Director 
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SECTION ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This Discussion Paper presents a report on a literature survey 
of alternative market structures, carried out under contract to the 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
This report has been divided into two Parts. Part 1 (Sections 
2 to 7) presents summaries of papers grouped into studies of marketing 
institutions and performance, discussions of some marketing oPtions 
available, analyses of market performance and brief comments on the 
export market environment and economic and marketing theory. These 
summaries are entirely drawn from the relevant papers and do not 
necessarily reflect the judgements of the authors of this report. Part 
2 (Sections 8 to 11) of the report presents a summary and discussion of 
the results of the literature review, including key references. 
Sections 8 and 9 outline the main characteristics of domestic 
agricultural markets and some factors which determine market structure, 
as presented by various authors. In Section 10 a discussion of the 
objectives of the major types of statutory marketing organisations and 
associated arrangements which exist in the agricultural sector of 
developed economies is presented. 
Section 11.1 consolidates the findings of workers who have 
analysed aspects of the performance of statutory marketing authorities. 
Measures for price and income enhancement and stabilisation are 
considered, as well as their effect on economic efficiency. Finally, 
Section 11.2 examines the role of the market environment in determining 
the nature of marketing institutions. 
This review has briefly outlined the elements of marketing 
systems for agricultural products (i.e. food and fibre products) as 
they apply to domestic markets. A natural progression from this point 
would be to focus· on a narrower field: that of specific horticultural 
products or product groups, and the marketing environment which they 
might face in international markets. This Discussion Paper therefore 
provides a framework within which further work of a more specific 
nature should be undertaken. Research Reports 173 and 174 present the 
results of further study of the horticultural sector. 
1 

PART ONE 
SECTION 2 
MARKETING STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS 
2.1 Price Formation and the Performance of Agro-food Systems 
• ••••• q ...... 
OECD 
The price system in the market economy should ensure that: 
1. the agro-food system should perform consistently with the 
objectives and policies at a national and internatiotnal level; 
2. the agro-food system should achieve cost minimising resource 
allocation; 
3. participants should not receive supernormal profits (defined by 
the economy as a whole). 
Performance of the agro-food system should be measured by the 
same criteria as for the economy as a whole. Policy makers need to 
establish the rules of governing the price-formation process which will 
generate as nearly as possible the outcomes they prefer. Price 
formation is determined by the market structure, the characteristics of 
the product, the nature and behaviour of economic agents in the 
process, and the nature of price discovery mechanisms. Price 
efficiency in agro-food systems will clear the market in the short 
term, and in the long term, will fully reflect consumer preferences and 
the costs of production. 
Studies presented at the seminar are summarised. Of the three 
papers which discussed international prices and domestic price 
formation, where the bulk of production was exported, similar 
characteristics were noted: one or a few agencies dealt with 
exporting, with direct or indirect government involvement; and 
domestic prices were ruled by export prices. 
2.2 pJffiamics of ~rketin~ Channelst a f2Jsribution tola Frame o.~ Reference for Marketing Channe s Research in ~ort1culture 
•• ; _. A 
Meulenberg, MTG 
Marketing channels for horticultural products evolve from the 
distribution policies of producers and other participants in the 
channel. Criteria by which producers can evaluate marketing channels 
are oulined, and include optimal market access, efficiency of 
distribution, and bargaining power. 
Markets for 
than static. There 
horticultural produce tend to be dynamic 
is therefore a need for firms which are 
3 
rather 
large 
4 
enough to implement mark.et policies which can incorporate changes in 
product, distribution and price, and can undertak.e promotion. 
Meulenberg suggests that as a mark.et moves from stasis to dynamism, the 
mark.et structure also develops along a path from pure competition 
towards oligopoly. Therefore concentration of supply, e.g. through 
co-operatives, mark.eting boards or producer groups, is necessary to set 
up an adequate market policy. 
Some problems encountered in the evolution of horticultural 
marketing systems include: 
1. different marketing objectives pursued by the participants in a 
market channel; 
2. the resources of anyone participant may be inadequate; 
3. the inertia of established market channels with respect to 
change, or conflicts with new channels; 
4 .. adequate 
product. 
bargaining power requires concentration of supply 
Many producers have not yet appreciated this. 
of 
Vertical co-operation, although not necessarily vertical 
integration, is clearly desirable to overcome these problems. A 
systems approach rather than an institutional approach is favoured for 
marketing channel research. 
2.3 Agricultural Co-operatives and the Theory of the Firm 
.. 4 4 .eJ .. ¥ • 
Bateman, DI el al 
This paper distinguishes between requisite societies in which 
farmers purchase goods co-operatively, and marketing co-operatives, 
where farmers sell their individual outputs through a jointly owned 
processing unit. Bateman examines eight maximising objectives for each 
type of co-operative: 
1. Profit maximisation of the co-operative firm; 
2. Joint profit maximisation; 
3. Output or throughput maximisation; 
4. Maximisation of membership; 
5. Maximisation of producer (consumer) surplus plus profit; 
6. Maximisation of patronage refunds; 
7. Maximisation of net returns per unit (minimisation of net price 
per unit); 
8. Maximisation of producer (or consumer) surplus. 
A weakness is that the models are unrealistic; most societies 
are multi-purpose. Non-maximising objectives are discussed briefly. 
5 
These include: 
1. Encouraging a spirit of self help; 
2. Enabling satisficing between price, dividend, and capital 
accumulation; 
3. Preventing oligopolistic or oligopsonistic exploitation, 
thereby minimising supernormal profits in the system; 
4. Providing a window on reality, i.e. proving to members that 
exploitation is not occurring as they may suppose. 
2.4 Economic Development and Fruit and Vegetable Market 
'brganisatton 0 4 • • 4 
4 • 
Montigaud, JC el al 
The paper compares the organisation of the fruit and vegetable 
market in three countries with different levels of economic development 
(France, Spain, Canada), and presents three contentions: 
1. The need for supply control is no longer an issue. Short term 
adjustments are necessary. Long term supply control varies 
depending on the level of economic development of any country; 
2. Market organisation follows a distinct process: 
a) voluntary 
commodity 
a crisis; 
grouping of a minority of producers or a 
to enable marketing - usually as a result of 
b) more products are drawn in, with their own marketing 
groups; 
c) more producers join the organisation 
membership becomes compulsory; 
eventually, 
d) the organisation begins international co-ordination 
with other producer bodies in other countries; 
e) the organisation integrates vertically 
wholesaling, and processing. 
shipping, 
3. Highly evolved forms of market organisation depend on high 
levels of economic development. 
Attitudes towards intervention by Government vary from: 
a) "free-market" - no private or public organisation; 
b) "organised free-market" - prices are set by the market 
via the auction system; there is free entry of 
participants; 
c) large firms create oligopoly and organise the market by 
d) 
6 
implied agreement; 
"professional 
sionals assume 
necessary; 
interventionalism" private profes-
leadership of the industry when it is 
e) "public interventionalism" creation of public 
institutions with the objective of short and long term 
market regulation, observing both consumer and producer 
interests, and co-ordinating different levels of 
marketing systems. 
If the organisation of the market increases, new problems 
occur, e.ge those concerning national co-ordination, or protection 
from foreign competition. Also, as one commodity market becomes 
organised with limited entry, producers will shift to other less 
organised products, generating demand from existing producers for 
market regulatione Greater vertical co-ordination is necessary to 
ensure equitable spread of risk. Consumer organisations 
supermarkets, etc, generally oppose producer organisations. 
Governments may also prefer market structures which are less organised 
and therefore gain lower prices for products. 
2.5 Horticulture and the New Zealand Economy; Some Suggested 
5evelopments in RorticUltura! tconomics - • 
"'_ • 0_ .~ 
Rae, AN 
The paper briefly describes kiwifruit marketing and some of the 
problems encountered, such as irrational distribution of supplies 
between markets, possibly caused by inexperienced exporters, 
perishability of produce, and which result in lower prices. 
Rae speculates whether state marketing boards could improve 
foreign exchange earnings from exporting of kiwifruit. Evidence 
suggests that marketing boards do more to increase earnings by 
manipulating price and supply with a given demand, rather than by 
establishing markets and increasing demand. 
Some alternatives are considered. These include the 
establishment of Marketing Authorities with power to licence exporters, 
or the extension of producer co-operatives into export marketing. Rae 
suggests that the potential of these institutions to export high value, 
perishable product should be explored. 
The strength of present private enterprise exporting was that 
some of the 10-15 exporters involved in the kiwifruit export industry 
had marketing experience to mount sophisticated market development 
programmes, from which all exporters have benefited. Also, vigorous 
competition between exporters had improved producers' prices in New 
Zealand. 
7 
2.6 Panel Discussion of State Trading Agencies 
. .4. •. .•• u.. ... 
Warley, TK 
State Trading Agencies are described as "exporting and 
importing on government-defined transaction terms". International 
trade in agricultural produce is conducted by a variety of 
institutions, often with different objectives, practices, and market 
power. The majority of developed market economies use State Trading 
Agencies to manage importing and exporting activities - in 1976, 30 
percent and 40 percent of United States exports and imports 
respectively involved State Trading Agencies. Three factors in the 
growth in importance of State Trading Agencies are suggested: 
1. increasing participation in trade by centrally planned and 
developing economies; 
2. expansion of international commodity trading arrangements; 
3. existence of State Trading Agencies induces their formation in 
trading partners. 
The presence and behaviour of State Trading Agencies in an 
international market must have an influence on the price discovery 
mechanisms and stability of the market. The GATT requires State 
Trading Agencies to be non-discriminatory and governed by commercial 
considerations in their transactions, but this has little influence on 
some nations. 
Warley suggests that the basic theoretical constructs to 
describe the activities of State Trading Agencies in the international 
commodity markets are inadequate. 
2.7 Marketing Boards as Societal Marketing Systems 
1. 
e. ~ * 4 • ' 
Izraeli, D; Zif, J 
A marketing system in a complex economy needs to: 
allow for competition while 
aspects; 
minimising its dysfunctional 
2. provide better co-ordination when the market mechanism is 
insufficient, while minimising Government intervention; 
3. enable social objectives (consumer interests, 
be conSidered, without losing the 
intrepreneurship and competition. 
e 
ecology etc) to 
benefits from 
Marketing boards can be classified following from Abbott and 
Creupelandt as: 
Non-Trading: 
, 
a) advisory and promotional boards, which engage in market 
research and promotional activities; 
8 
b) regulatory boards, which monitor Quality assurance and 
packing standards; 
c) price stabilisation boards, which engage in supply 
management and/or price fixing and deficiency payments. 
Trading: 
%1$ 
a) price stabilisation boards with trading powers which 
maintain buffer stocks to stabilise prices; 
b) export monopoly boards, which may act as sole sellers 
or may appoint agents to sell produce overseas; 
c) domestic monopoly boards, which act as sole traders and 
processors, sometimes through agents. 
The objectives of marketing boards can be categorised thus: 
1. improved profitability for producers; 
2. increased productivity as a means of increasing profitability; 
3. market development; 
4. social responsibility; 
normSj 
conforming with social and political 
5. innovation, as a means of achieving economic progress. 
Some of these objectives conflict, and the weight attached to 
them varies from one board to another. 
In unorganised agricultural markets, the first level 
intermediaries (handlers) and sometimes the processors are the price 
markers, with the producer and the consumer having both the greatest 
numbers and the least bargaining power» being the price-takers. 
Therefore voluntary hortizontal integration to improve bargaining power 
results in the formation of co-operatives, marketing agencies and 
boards. Consumer co-operation is relatively more recent, and is 
usually dealt with as a role of government; giving partial 
justification for government intervention in the market. 
2.8 What are Marketing Orders? 
4 •• • 
Jesse, EV (three papers) 
Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 1937 and 
amendments, producers and handlers of specified fruits and vegetables 
1n the United States may seek fruit and vegetable marketing orders to 
alleviate marketing problems. A marketing order is a regulatory 
programme issued by the Secretary of Agriculture at the request of 
growers which legally obligates all commodity producers and handlers to 
abide by order terms. These typically involve regulation of commodity 
Quality and quantity, packing standards, and conduct of research and 
9 
market development projects. Volume management is implemented through 
producer allotments and market allocation plans, and market flows are 
regulated by reserve pools, shipping holidays and "prorates" 
limitations on the maximum volume a handler may ship over a stated 
p,:riod. 
Quality control provisions set m~n~mum grade, size and maturity 
standards. Market support activities promote more orderly marketing 
and can include standardisation of packaging, levying of fees on 
handlers to finance research in production, marketing or advertising. 
Marketing orders are administered by a nominated committee of 
unsalaried grower and handler representatives, who recommend regulatory 
policy to the Secretary of Agriculture. Proposed regulations are 
publicly notified before final regulations are issued. Committee 
expenses are funded by a levy on handlers; of the 47 commodities for 
which marketing orders exist, the median producer membership is seven 
and the median handler membership is four. 
A review of costs and benefits identified as benefits the 
following: 
1. stabilised producer prices and incomes due to quantity 
controls, which are typically applied during years of high 
production but do not affect prices in years of short supply; 
2. stimulated production due to the reduced risk following on 
income stabilisation; 
3. increased quality assurance, reduced handling costs and waste 
resulting from more uniform, higher quality product; 
4. yield-increasing and cost-reducing research funded by handler 
levies; 
5. increased amount and availability of marketing information 
leading to better decision making. 
Possible costs included the following: 
1. where quantity controls are applied continuously, long-run 
adjustments of productive capacity could lead to inefficient 
resource allocation and surplus crops; 
2. where the cost of allotments was high, new producers could be 
denied entry, leading to deficits of productive capacity;_ 
3. seasonal volume controls such as prorates could restrain a 
handler from operating at an optimum level; 
4. seasonal volume controls could reduce price competition; 
5. Size, grade and maturity standards may reduce the range of 
consumer choice with respect to quality. 
Effects of 
between consumers, 
marketing orders included transfers 
handlers and producers. Producers gain 
of income 
short-run 
10 
advantages at the expense of consumers where quantity controls are 
concerned. In some cases, prorates and shipping holidays result in 
income transfers from handlers to producers; and marketing orders, by 
imposing industry goals on individuals limit the flexibility in 
decision-making by both producers and handlers. 
2.9 Organisational Structure and Marketing Strategy. A Study of 
Co~operativeBarke·tlng in EuroiPean agriculture 
44 «d «4 
Foxall» GR 
Chapter 1 analyses variations in market shares 
co-operatives in EEC countries$ Market shares are assumed to 
farmers' willingness to deal through co-operatives, and thus 
how effective a market force a co-operative is perceived to be. 
held by 
indicate 
indicate 
The EEC countries are classified into groups which show: 
1. consistently high co-operative shares of a number of markets 
(France, Denmark, Holland); 
2. co-operative shares which are inconsistent although high in 
some cases (West Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland); 
3. co-operative shares which are negligible from most products but 
are still important in a few cases (Belgium, Italy); 
4. the UK whose comparative co-operative market share is low. 
Some possible reasons for the difference between nations, and 
between the UK and the rest of EEC are examined, including EEC 
members~ip itself, financing arrangements, legislation, management and 
co-operation among co-operatives. Some related factors which may 
explain some of the difference are: 
1. government policies 
structures; 
encouraging alternative marketing 
2. guaranteed prices can reduce the incentive for producers to be 
anything but production-oriented; 
3. failure of the Agricultural Wholesale Society, which forced the 
growth of alternatives; 
4. most EEC nations have an export-based food economy, whereas the 
UK has not. 
Management was held to be of central importance to the success 
or failure of co-operatives, but not to explain the difference between 
the UK and EECe Co~operatives in Europe usually have three levels; 
the producer groups (primary), regional- or commodity-based federations 
of co-operatives (second tier), and third-tier co-operatives which 
operate at national level. Secondary and tertiary co-operatives exert 
strong, centralised management control over primary co-operatives, thus 
redUCing competition, allowing intergration and larger economies of 
scale, and reducing the democratic involvement of producers in 
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decision-making. 
Chapters 2 to 9 examine the EEC nations individually, and 
Chapter 10 presents hypotheses about the relationship between 
organisational structure and market strategy with reference to the UK. 
Foxall's hypothesis is to the effect that certain types of 
structure (seconda·ry or tertiary co-operatives) facilitate development 
and exercise of market power, which is expressed in high levels of 
market share. 
While the UK has a number of co-operatives which are quite 
large, the structure of secondary and tertiary co-operatives such as 
those existing in Europe is relatively under-developed. Exercise of 
the characteristics of those structures - low autonomy at primary 
level, ability to compel the activities of member co-operatives, 
centralised management - is contrary to the principles of co-operative 
societies in the UK, which are embodied in law and cannot be 
contravened. Tertiary or "super-co-operativell bodies in Europe which 
have strong marketing strategies tend to become self-perpetuating 
corporate bodies. 
The author concludes that for co-operatives to advance the 
market share of producers it is necessary for some form of 
oligopolistic marketing structure to exist. Further, secondary and 
tertiary co-operatives may be necessary to interpret EEC common 
agricultural policy to producers. For co-operatives in the UK to 
achieve this, they must develop similar types of organisation to those 
prevailing in Europe. 
2.10 Israeli Marketing Boards and Their Environment $I. 4. 4 
Izraeli, D; Zif, J 
Agriculture development and production in Israel is based on a 
policy of active government intervention, to achieve as targets: 
1. income maintenance and socially just distribution of income; 
2. increased agricultural production, import substitution and 
export; 
3. non-economic goals such as population dispersion. 
In 1973, Israel was 70 percent self-sufficient in agricultural 
production, of which 87 percent was under the control of one of 13 
production and marketing boards. There is no general enabling 
legislation for the establishment of such boards; each requires 
specific legislation, and only five of the 13 have statutory authority. 
Board membership must comprise 50 percent producers, 25 percent 
Government, 25 percent public (processors, wholesalers, retailers, 
consumers). The boards can thus be defined as societal boards in that 
all participants in the production-processing-distribution-consumption 
process are explicity represented. 
Boards can be described as advisory, with a responsibility to 
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direct and regulate marketing, or executive, with responsibilities to 
engage in local and export marketing. There has been a general 
tendency for advisory boards to take on more executive functions; 
three of the five executive boards were initially advisory. 
All of the boards have advisory and promotional, regulatory and 
price-stabilising functions. Eight have additional trading functions, 
with seven of these acting as export monopoly boards. However, the 
activities of any board on behalf of anyone of the products it is 
responsible for can vary from minimal to comprehensive, depending on 
the marketing requirements for that product~ 
Agricultural production is based on two forms of agricultural 
settlement: the kibbutz or collective settlement in which all property 
is commonly owned, and the moshav or co-operative settlement comprising 
groups of small family farms with members co-operating in marketing and 
mutual aid for weaker members $ A small number of moshavim have a 
central farm which is communally owned and worked, surrounded by small 
plots privately owned by members. 
Eight of the marketing boards trade in produce to stabilise 
prices but only three of these act as domestic monopolists (for citrus 
fruit, potatoes and onions, and cotton). Price stabilisation in the 
non-trading boards is generally managed by government-funded subsidy. 
This has given government considerable power over those boards with 
statutory authority, but as policy has changed and subsidies are less 
favoured, Government's control over agriculture is diminishing. 
Generally, marketing boards do not intervene once produce has 
reached the processor or wholesaler. The largest wholesaling 
organisation . in Israel is Tnuva, a central wholesale marketing 
association of agricultural markets. Tnuva attempts to reconcile 
adequate minimum producer prices with reasonable consumer prices, by 
reducing intermediary handling of products. Advice is given on 
handling and packing produce. Tnuva also maintains processing 
companies which absorb seasonal surpluses, and handles citrus and other 
export products through subsidiaries. 
Government involvement, as well as a diminishing function of 
price support, includes industry planning, research, and extension 
services. Research and extension has been vital to Israel's expansion 
in agriculture. 
Exporting of agricultural products is characterised by a highly 
centralised market structure. The production and marketing boards are 
the sole exporting authorities for their particular commodities. 
Growers or wholesalers who want to export independently must 
co-ordinate their activities with the appropriate board. Some less 
perishable commodities are exported by the controlling board acting 
individually (citrus, cotton, groundnuts); more perishable produce is 
handled by Agrexco, a non-profit marketing company jointly owned by the 
remaining export monopoly boards, the government and Tnuva. Agrexco 
enables the pooling of resources to more efficiently ha~dle, store, 
transport, promote and sell highly perishable products in markets which 
have high penetration expenses; and undertakes the charter of 
refrigerated ships and aircraft for rapid transport, and maintenance of 
regional sales offices abroad. All Israeli produce handled by Agrexco 
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is marketed under the brand name of "Carmel". 
2.11 Agricultural Marketing for Exports: The Israeli Case of 
'E"xpOrt"s-oT Fresh -Produce • i,a c _ • 
QQ. 
Shehory, Y 
The successful development of Israel's fresh produce exporting 
industry is due in part to a philosophy that marketing abroad should be 
handled through one channel, by one hand. This allows the grouping 
rather than fragmentation of resources, and the building of a 
infrastructure which would be impossible for small exports. A single 
channel also avoids seller competition abroad, and allows comprehensive 
market strategies aimed at maximising returns. 
In Israel farm production is characterised by co-operative or 
collective farms which are highly capital intensive because of 
objections to hired labour. Labour costs are high, with a high 
standard of living in rural areas. Developing export markets required 
changes in plots and cultivars in some cases. There was little initial 
knowledge of post-harvest handling of perishables, and relatively high 
distances from Israel to export markets. Assets which Israel relied on 
in overcoming these problems included an open-minded farming community, 
good agricultural research facilities and extension services, and an 
agricultural industry mostly organised into production and marketing 
boards, which act as sole exporters. For less perishable items such as 
cotton, citrus and groundnuts, the boards also carry out exports. But 
for more perishable produce, individual boards and government formed 
Agrexco, an agricultural exporting company which is 50 percent 
government funded and is a non-profit organisation. Agrexco combines 
the resources of individual boards for export, and is responsible for 
refrigeration, storage, transport, sales offices, and promotion 
activities. Some products go to a central packing house, while others 
are packaged by the farmer. This is considered to be sociologically 
more acceptable; control of identifiable product is retained further 
along the process, and the product is accepted or rejected in packed 
form. Quality control is therefore directly associated with the 
farmer's activities. In order to reduce the dissemination time for new 
information, some farmers in each region are selected to grow new 
cultivars or to apply new methods. Government finance protects against 
total loss in the case of a crop failure. 
Promotion efforts are two-fold; one involves building up the 
trademark of "Carmel" as a trademark abroad, and the second involves 
market development of new commodities, such as avocadoes or peppers. 
The maximum level of Government participation amoun~ to 50 percent. 
Some perishable products are exported by their own marketing boards, 
e.g. flowers. Private exporters of flowers often concentrate on the 
main market, and can outbid each other. Also, as smaller traders there 
is little flexibility in terms of alternative outlets when the market 
is over-supplied. Phenomena of this type are generally avoided by 
Agrexco. 
2 .. 12 
14 
Administered Price Formation of Agricultural Products and the 
Use of Computer 'Moders in Finlana 4 4 .. -
P e. p sa .uc. 
Kettunen, L 
The agricultural sector in Finland is characterised by many 
small family farms, low per unit yields, migration of labour to cities, 
and over-supply of some produce which is uncompetitive to export.. The 
aim of the government is self-sufficiency in food production, and 
retention of rural population. Pricing policy is to fix the target 
producer prices to: 
a) cover costs, and 
b) ensure an equitable income. 
Any deviations from the target price greater than five percent 
are adjusted by appropriate policy_ This can involve differential 
prices for produce from low-producing units. Surplus production is 
exported, with a subsidy to offset differences between the world price 
and the production cost. On some commodities production ceilings have 
been set which limit the volume of exports which government is prepared 
to subsidise. Beyond that level the producer bears the loss himself. 
The Role of Government in Post Farm-Gate Price Determination 
Txi' 't'anad"a • ••
__ w
Hemming, AJ 
The processing, distribution and retail sector (i.e. the post 
farm-gate sector) in Canada is described. The industry is 
oligopolistic in nature, with a high degree of price transparency in 
agricultural raw materials markets. Price control has occaSionally 
been exerted by government through various boards, which have been 
disbanded when their mandate was complete, but price formation and 
improvements in price efficiency are largely left up to industry. 
Government's role is generally confined to redress an inbalance of 
bargaining power between farms and the processing, distribution and 
retail sector, by legislation enabling marketing boards and by measures 
to improve farm-gate price transparency; and by generating an 
environment favourable to dynamic efficiency and growth. 
2.14 Recent Changes in the Constitution and Powers of the Australian 
t'far"ke"ti'Iig10ards·- .' - ...... • •• 
Campbell, KO 
This article reviews recent changes in the 
administrative responsibilities of the federal and 
boards in Australia .. 
composition and 
state marketing 
Marketing boards generally exist at two levels: federal boards 
which are primarily concerned with regulating overseas trade, but with 
the exception of the Wheat Board do not themselves engage in trade, and 
state marketing boards, of which most but not all operate as producer 
monopolies in the domestic market. 
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Federal or Commonwealth marketing boards each have their own 
enabling legislation and therefore are not entirely uniform in nature. 
Some boards were established on the producers' initiative and some on 
government initiative. During the 1970s reforms to marketing 
legislation embodied four main points: 
1. Efforts were made to reduce producer control, by reducing the 
number and proportion of board members who represent the 
producer, and by appointing rather than electing 
representatives. Some marketing boards have been restructured 
as corporations. 
2. Marketing expertise has been enlarged by appointment of 
industry representatives with financial, managerial expertise. 
3. Provision has been made for intervention in the Board's affairs 
by the Minister for Primary Industry. 
4. Extension of trading powers enables Boards to more easily break 
into new markets, or deal with centrally planned economies. 
Most of these changes are politically inspired and have met 
with some producer resistance. However, this is not consistent for all 
producers, who have been accustomed to varying levels of intervention 
for various commodities, and the author suggests that producers under 
economic stress look to change as a remedy, rather than a specific 
direction of change. 
State marketing boards, which are described as "compulsory 
marketing co-operatives", are also subject to pressure to reform. The 
extent and direction of reform differs between states; in Victoria 
reforms follow the Federal Board reforms, while in New South Wales, the 
reverse is true. Farmer interest in state marketing boards varies over 
time, but is generally held to be against major reforms. In New South 
Wales, 10 of the 13 boards established up to 1971 have been disbanded, 
but a further six, mostly associated with new commodities, have since 
been set up. 
The author concludes that producer controlled marketing boards 
are an anachronism in modern western societies and they are likely to 
be replaced in Australia by statutory marketing corporations. 
2.15 Agricultural Marketing Boards 
eo • 4' I. 
Hoos. S (ed) 
The Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics (University 
of California) has undertaken a research study at the request of the 
USDA, of experiences with marketing boards in other countries so that 
guidelines could be put forward for a possible policy change in the 
United States. 
The objectives of the study are: 1) to present general 
specialised information distilled from the experience of other nations 
with marketing boards (England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, West 
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Africa, Israel, and The Netherlands) and 2) to provide a basis for 
considering agricultural marketing boards as a replacement for the 
agricultural marketing agreements and orders in operation in the United 
States since 1937. These orders and agreements stem from recovery 
legislation enacted during the Great Depression of the 1930s. As both 
marketing orders and marketing boards evolved, the pattern of original 
voluntary co-operation was seen to be a weakness since it allowed 
non-participants to remain outside the co-operative and still derive 
benefits. To cope with this situation marketing order legislation was 
written and marketing boards were developed. 
Criticism of marketing boards includes arguments against their 
compulsory aspect, and also that farmers as a single sector of society 
have too much influence on their composition and operations. However 
marketing boards should not be viewed as huge stereotyped institutions 
everywhere, rather as organisations reflecting a dynamic relationship 
with government policy. They are creatures of government and are 
subject to amendments, modification, and even annulment. 
Enabling legislation for marketing boards specifies their 
objectives, usually in broad terms. A recurrent objective is the 
raising or maintaining of incomes over time, by development and use of 
marketing procedures to favourably affect farm prices and returns. 
This would include establishment and operation of quality standards. 
The success of marketing boards in achieving their objectives is not 
well documented, however after existing for more than forty years, they 
remain a favoured avenue among farmers and agricultural policy 
activitists to achieve improved returns to growers. 
Marketing boards can be divided into domestic or export boards 
which can be further subdivided into trading and non-trading boards. 
All boards are concerned with production, marketing and/or price. 
Some issues that remain unresolved from this study are: 
1. Are the objectives commonly stated rational ones? 
2. Why establish a separate organisation such as a board instead 
of a branch of a central agricultural agency with the same 
goals, duties and means? 
3. What should be the composition of a board? 
4. Should the central (government) agency have review and veto 
power over board-delegated operations? 
5. Should marketing boards be established by legislatiotn? 
6. What is the best way to keep a board vital and relevant? 
The bargaining power of boards is not really defined and has 
not been measured. The author does put forward a definition where the 
sum of the bargaining power of the seller and buyer equals one. The 
outcome price depends on the target prices of both and the seller's 
bargaining power increases with the volume he has to sell. 
Among the criticisms of boards is their frequent use of quota 
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systems. They may not have the conceptual design or the operational 
know-how to implement a system that is acceptable to the industry. The 
current need is for a quota system that is theoretically sound, 
administratively feasible, and politically acceptable. Since economic 
theory in this area is still underdeveloped, acceptance and operation 
of boards is under threat. Other criticisms are recognition by boards 
of both efficiency and equity. From the view of farmers, handler and 
other industry participants, neither marketing boards nor marketing 
orders have a compelling advantage. 
The author sums up this overview by stating that marketing 
boards in many cases are directed by their enabling legislation to 
concern themselves with variability over time with prices 
(uncertainty). Farmers have come to look to marketing boards as aids 
in dampening the market variabilities that produce uncertainty. Of 
course there is no guarantee that the board's interference by affecting 
sales and purchases at appropriate times will dampen rather than 
enlarge price variability. Thus although the objectives of boards and 
marketing orders are similar, there are fundamental differences in 
their breadth and strength. Boards usually exert more authority, often 
regulating production on the farm as well as at the marketing level. 
The choice between them would therefore entail the US government to 
consider both economic and social policy as well as the philosophy of 
an institution designed to bolster the income position of farmers. 
2.16 US Marketing Agreements and Orders: A Retrospective View 
• • up>. • 
Hoos, S 
The main purpose of agricultural marketing order programs is to 
increase producers' net returns. To achieve this objective, marketing 
orders include various types of provisions: control of volume 
marketed, Size, grade, pack, or container regulation; and the 
prohibition of unfair trade practices. Each order may include one or 
more of these provisions, depending on the particular order and whether 
it is based on federal or state legislation. Most states do not 
provide for volume control but federal marketing orders do control 
volume and prohibit unfair trade practices. Federal advertising and 
sales promotion is generally not provided for in the legislation. 
As with other tools, the effectiveness of marketing orders 
depends upon the skill and judgement of the operators and the nature of 
the problems involved. Granting that marketing orders can do certain 
types of jobs, one must note that marketing orders are not dOing the 
job that is often attributed to them. They have not, in fact, solved 
some of the really significant problems, particularly those involved 
with chronic surplus situations. In the author's judgement 
agricultural marketing orders do have a valid role to play, but this 
role is limited to particular crops at particular times and under 
particular conditions. These conditions are (if volume control is 
exercised): 
1. The demand for a crop at the farm level should be 
price-inelastic with not too low income inelasticity, and the 
demand cross elastiCities should not be high (relative to other 
agricultural products). 
4. 
2.17 
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A community of mutual interests, in particular in marketing 
problems, must exist among the participating growers and/or 
handlersc 
The production 
similarity of 
growers exist. 
is concentrated in small enough areas so 
production and marketing conditions among 
that 
the 
Some actively interested organisation (eQge co-operative) 
educates the growers about the program, urging them to vote, 
sponsoring able men to sit on the administrative board~ 
encouraging the adoption of amendments to meet changing needs, 
and promoting the program as beneficial to individual growers 
as well as the group. 
The British Experience 
P 4 • 
Currie, JM and Rayner, AJ 
The British Agricultural Marketing Baords are essentially 
producer co-operative organisations with statutory coercive powersc 
Currently, they regulate the marketing of four commodities milk, 
potatoes, fleece wool, and hops. Agricultural Marketing Acts (1931, 
33, 49, 58) have furnished the relevant enabling legislation. The 
activities of the British boards have to be viewed against the 
background of an economy that imports a large proportion - currently 
some 35 percent - of its requirements for agricultural products. The 
boards' powers of market control have been confined to domestic 
supplies and decisions concerning import restrictions have always been 
the prerogative of government. 
Marketing boards have existed in Britain for over forty years, 
yet no real consensus has been reached regarding the lessons to be 
learned from this experience. First there is the basic controversy 
over the desirability of having any enabling legislation at all, second 
there may be disagreement over a particular provision of the 
legislation, third there may be controversy over the desirability of a 
statutory marketing scheme for a certain agricultural product, and 
fourth there may be disagreement over the way a board uses the powers 
conferred on ite 
Fears that individual farmers would lose their independence and 
that boards might abuse their monopoly powers have largely been 
obviated. There is little evidence to suggest that individual 
producers have been seriously disadvantaged in the interests of the 
majority, and the pessimistic vision of powerful boards charging 
consumers extortionate prices for essential food items has certainly 
not been realised. The reasons are probably because: 1) the 
continuation of schemes requires substantial producer support, 2) the 
individual producer can appeal against activities of the board, and 3) 
proviSions for consumers committees, ministerial directives and 
parliamentary amendments of schemes, as well as 4) Britain's heavy 
dependence on agricultural imports, have all prevented monopoly power 
of boards and producers' lack of independence. 
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However if the worst fears towards marketing boards have not 
materialised, it must be admitted that the optimistic expectations of 
the sponsors of the legislation have not been realised either. That 
is, the farming community has not been made self reliant. For certain 
commodities there have been improvements in the efficiency of the 
marketing process or in market stability as a result of activities of 
boards (e.g. wool board, milk board, potato board). However in 
general such gains have been relatively modest, and to have made 
farmers genuinely self reliant would have required many more boards and 
a considerable burden on consumers. The boards would have to have 
extensive monopoly powers. 
In the final analysis it is impossible to be sure whether 
British farmers have actually benefited from marketing boards because 
it is impossible to know what policy measures would have been 
implemented in their place. All we can be sure about is that the 
majority of affected farmers think that they have benefited. 
2.18 New Zealand Marketing Boards 
su ow • ( • 
Veeman, MD 
This paper describes the establishment and evolution of New 
Zealand boards (for major exports of dairy produce, meat, and wool, and 
also apples and pears, tobacco, milk, potatoes, wheat, and pork) and 
other similar bodies known as marketing authorities (eggs, citrus 
fruits, and honey). It outlines the activities of each of the main 
boards in turn and then goes on to describe the effects of these 
activities. 
The general objectives of enhancing producers' prices and 
incomes, reducing fluctuations in producers' prices and incomes, and 
providing for a measure of equity of marketing opportunities between 
producers are common to many of the boards, but vary in consistence and 
importance between each one. 
The effects of major board activities are related to these 
three objectives. The first, enhancing producers' prices and incomes, 
has led to attempting to increase demand, increase efficiency (reduce 
marketing margins), and by using their enhanced bargaining power to 
improve the price and income to producers. The effects of these 
efforts have been mixed. The Dairy Board and Meat Board have had some 
success in increasing demand through product and market identification. 
The Apple and Pear Board and to a lesser extent the Citrus Marketing 
Authority have also had useful effects. On the other hand the Meat 
Board also has instances where insufficient attention and expertise 
have been directed at expansion of markets. The fluid milk, citrus and 
honey boards can also be criticised for paying too little attention to 
the potential of the domestic market. Increasing efficiency, if 
successful should provide gains to both consumers and producers. 
However, these activities are unlikely to result in major increases in 
producers' prices. Some boards have successfully introduced 
cost-reducing technologies. For example, the Dairy Board in the 
processing of dairy products, the major export boards in allocating and 
timing shipping space as well as in the handling of their products, and 
the Wool Marketing Corporation in using objective measurements for wool 
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sales. Examples of inefficiencies resulting from boards' activities 
are the Milk Board and Egg Marketing Authority whose control systems 
limit adjustment of production to changing market conditions. The 
Apple and Pear Board's setting of retailers' margins does not encourage 
competition, and the Meat Board's adjustment of export grades in line 
with market preferences appears to suffer undue time lags. The 
enhanced bargaining power of boards has had some success in respect of 
gaining additional income from processors and input suppliers. 
Examples are; the negotiation of freight rates by export boards has 
kept increases in shipping costs down, and the internalisation of 
trading profits by the Dairy Board~ The bargaining power of boards in 
increasing returns from consumers and government has been limited 
because the boards usually include government members who are generally 
expected to represent consumers' interests. However, both the Dairy 
Board and the Apple and Pear Marketing Board have increased producers 
returns through their marketing strategies. 
The second objective of reducing fluctuations in producers' 
prices has also produced mixed success in terms of the boards' 
activities. The pricing procedures and marketing policies of the Dairy 
Board have succeeded in dampening price and income fluctuations. The 
Wool Marketing Corporation's activities also seem to have had some 
effect on reducing fluctuations in auction prices of wool. The Apple 
and Pear Marketing Board has stabilised prices to producers and 
consumers both within seasons and season to season. 
Finally in considering the third general board objective of 
providing equity of market opportunities and returns between producers, 
the author states that most boards consider this as a secondary 
objective. The exception is the Dairy Board which tries to equalise 
market returns, but this action has had the effect of reducing the 
flexibility of the Board's operationsc 
The author concludes "that a number of these bodies possess the 
potential for more effective performance, though on balance, boards 
have performed a useful function." Also the performance and 
effectiveness of different boards appears to be strongly associated 
with the capabilities of the individual board members. A possible 
solution is the institution of a periodic and stringent examination by 
an independent commission of enquiry to assess the legislation and 
evaluate the activities and economic effects of each board. This body 
would report to government any recommendations for change. 
2.19 Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada 
• • ... .P. $ 4 
Veeman, MD and Loyns, A 
Canadian boards covered about fifty farm products in 1969 and 
included 122 marketing boards of differing types of organisations~ 
More than 75 percent of the value of farm production is subject to some 
form of regulated marketing, although the precise form and extent of 
control varies widely. These boards range from bodies that sponsor or 
perform promotion and research activities funded by compulsory levies 
on producers of particular products to boards that perform virtually 
all the marketing functions (including administered pricing and control 
of the volume of production) for the commodities that they regulate. 
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The boards have been growing in importance in the last 50 years and 
during the past decade have become major instruments of agricultural 
policy at both the federal and provincial levels • 
. The objectives of Canadian marketing boards are not clearly 
specified in the enabling legislation. The primary implied objectives 
are achievement of some improvement in the level and stability of 
producer returns, some transfer of the balance of market power toward 
producers, and reduction in the degree of market uncertainty faced by 
producers. It is also frequently argued that stability in price and 
continuity of supply for consumers is an objective of the boards. 
General conclusions regarding overall performance of the boards 
can be made in terms of these objectives and in terms of overall 
efficiency and equity. It appears that the most restrictive boards 
have raised and stabilised producer prices. But these benefits have 
come at the expense of increased consumer prices and export 
opportunities. Also there appear to be some detrimental effects on th~ 
efficiency of resource allocation and in competition in processing. In 
addition on some occasions market uncertainty has been replaced by 
bureaucratic-decision making-induced uncertainty, with possibly as 
serious financial consequences. The more open (less restrictive) 
boards appear to have improved pricing and marketing efficiency to some 
degree, and also have offset oligopolistic power and improved producer 
confidence in the marketing system. Their price raising and 
stabilising abilities have been less than the more restrictive boards 
and they have attracted less public controversy. These boards have had 
a relatively neutral effect on consumers in comparison to the more 
restrictive ones. 

SECTION 3 
ANALYSES OF MARKETING INSTITUTION PERFORMANCE 
3.1 A Synoptic View of Agricultural Marketing Organisations in the 
United Kingdom 
• 4#0 •• I ._ .... 
* 
Warley, TK 
The author challenges the position that low incomes in 
agriculture are caused by marketing deficiencies, and suggests that low 
returns to resources are due instead to technological advances 
(yield-increasing), low price and income elasticities of demand for 
farm products, and to inadequate rates of movement of labour away from 
agriculture. It is suggested that while market systems are not 
perfect, they have some of the characteristics of efficient marketing -
i.e. profits, margins and costs are all kept fairly low by 
competition. However, ambiguous price Signals, price instability, 
perishability of product and distribution costs are a problem, and 
intervention by government or organised producer groups may be 
beneficial. 
The 
the level 
do this: 
purpose of intervention by producer groups is to improve 
and stability of producers' incomes. There are two ways to 
1. To raise on-farm demand by: 
a) raising consumer demand through marketing research and 
penetration, promotion and advertising programmes; 
b) identifying sub-demands and meeting them through 
quality control, grading and storage; 
c) raising derived demand by reducing marketing margins, 
through vertical integration and rationalised 
distribution of processing channels. 
2. To maximise returns from given on-farm demand, by 
a) long-run supply restriction using quotas and production 
licences; 
b) short-run supply restriction through support buying and 
diversion of product; 
c) discriminating marketing via price differentiation in 
sub-markets to equalise revenues. 
The appropriate type of market structure is determined by the 
objective: type 2 activities present opportunities for 
non-participating producers to benefit and therefore require a 
compulsory participation and a marketing board form of organisation; 
type 1 activities can be carried out by voluntary or co-operative 
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groups. 
Marketing co-operatives account for approximately five percent 
of farm products in the UK. Possible reasons for the low share of 
market are that farmers have favoured ,political means of income 
enhancement, ieee price support; economic and social heterogeneity in 
agriculture dissuades co-operation; during periods of prosperity there 
is little pressure to improve the market; there has been little 
government support for co-operatives; there are commercial weaknesses 
inherent in co-operatives, including democratic control, and managerial 
philosophy. 
Group marketing is characterised by associations of producers 
for the purpose of marketing improvement (which is not necessarily the 
object of co-operatives), mostly by type 1 activities. Groups create 
market power by efficient production, large scale sale of products of 
appropriate quality, volume and continuity. Marketing groups tend to 
be strictly commercial, and require capital contribution on entry, and 
operate as companies rather than friendly societies. 
Marketing boards in general were initially set up to circumvent 
perceived causes of low agricultural incomes, such as the activities of 
middlemen, poor market information, or poor grading and presentation of 
product. The intention was to claim the benefits of economies of scale 
in marketing for producers through large scale organisations with 
appropriate countervailing power against buyers. Compulsory 
participation ensured all producers contributed to costs of market 
intelligence, promotion and research. Boards have tended to adopt type 
2 strategies in enhancing incomes by manipulating supply, rather than 
by improving the operations of the market. Boards also have the 
function of being a convenient mechanism for the administration of 
price support schemes. Producers often perceive improved income 
resulting from price support as an outcome of marketing. Distribution 
of benefits therefore favours producers rather than consumers. 
Commodity Commissions are a post-war alternative to marketing 
boards, and are charged with identifying the needs of commodity groups 
for market reform, encouraging co-operatives and groups as the 
instrument of reform, and creating such special bodies as necessary to 
carry out research, market reform and development for the industry as a 
whole. 
Type 1 market reform strategies, if aimed at increasing farm 
income, may have little effect because: 
a) markets are reasonably efficient now, so that there is 
little chance of large cost economies or supernormal 
profits being reduced; 
b) quality premiums are relatively small both in volume 
and value; 
c) if the supply of product is price-elastic and demand 
price-inelastic (as is typical of agricultural 
product), benefits from reducing market margins will go 
to consumers; 
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d) some farms or products are not amenable to group or 
co-operative marketing. 
Therefore type 1 strategies are likely to appear unrewarding to 
producers. The interests of producers are best served by marketing 
boards exercising monopolistic control over supply and pricing, coupled 
with price support and/or protection against imports. 
3.2 Marketing Boards in Canada: Role, Impacts and Some Elements of 
i>"erform'ance':' • -. - .s " eo L¢ ..... "'0. 
• $4 
Proulx, Y 
Farm produce amounting to 60 percent of Canadian farm cash 
receipts was marketed by marketing boards in 1976. Almost all major 
Canadian agricultural products are regulated by such boards, defined as 
"a compulsory horizontal marketing organisation operating under 
government delegated authority". Functions of the boards include 
negotiating prices, designating sales agents, establishing quotas, and 
setting transport allowances. The Boards are funded by levies and/or 
by government. Control can be exercised by producers or 
state-appointed officers. Marketing boards are categorised into: 
1. negotiating agencies, concerned with producer prices and terms 
of sale; 
2. central selling 
these two types 
management; 
agencies, which sellon behalf of producers; 
represent marketing boards without supply 
3. price and volume regulatory agencies, concerned with supply 
management and price setting. 
Marketing boards without supply management increase the 
bargaining strength of many small producers, with consequent increase 
in farm price levels, but no discernible effect on consumer prices 
which are related to import prices. Such boards may have a positive 
effect on production also. The effect of negotiating and selling 
intervention is to re-organise the bargaining relationships between 
producers and processors, allowing the producer a larger share of the 
final price, rather than to increase consumer prices. Therefore their 
effectiveness is limited. 
Marketing boards with supply management require adequate 
protection from imports. Such boards increase producer prices but can 
also have a significant upward impact on consumer prices, as 
demonstrated when comparing Canadian and United States price movements 
for eggs and turkey. Stabilisation impacts are less than some workers 
expect and only occur with supply management. Industry output is 
generally less, .and there is little clear evidence of effects on 
productivity. 
The 
objectives 
sometimes 
from the 
author suggests that the marketing boards achieve their 
of improved producer prices and income stability, although 
at a cost to the consumer, and moreover the initiative comes 
producer. The most important criticism is that part of the 
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supply management benefits are capitalised into quota values, which 
eventually are included in production cost formulas, thereby reducing 
competitive advantage and reducing consumer benefits for no gain. But 
as the farm price is a relatively small component of consumer price, 
the effect would not be great~ Reduced competitive advantage could 
harm export volumes, but as supply management is usually only applied 
for commodities for the domestic market, this also may not be 
important. As supply-management agencies can have difficulties in 
assessing the price which will clear the market t changes in quota 
values could be used as an indicator of excess profits to producerse 
3.3 Supply and Price Control by Producer Groups on the Early Potato 
Ma."rket'*in Western G'ermany , • •• s 
••• p • ~u s. c 
Blumencron, HM van; Alvensleben R van 
Five producer groups control 25-30 percent of the total supply 
of early potatoes in West Germany. A quadratic programming model was 
developed to determine what share of the market the producer groups 
would need to command, to establish effective price and supply control. 
The model assumed: 
a) perfect competition; 
b) pure monopoly; 
c) part monopoly, controlling 
i) 25 percent of total supply and 
ii) 50 percent of total supply. 
The model showed that the main advantage of supply control 
under assumption (c) went to the un-organised producers the 
free-riders, suggesting that in seasons of large supply, individual 
producers will tend to break the cartel. Market strategies involving 
price and supply control by producer groups will only be effective if 
the groups control a very high market share. 
3.4 Market Instability, Stabilisation, and a New Zealand Case Study 
'in Guaranteed 'PrIcing' • • --
. ~ 
Rae, AN 
A market is said to be price-efficient if price signals freely 
reach the producer. Unstable prices can distort these signals when 
fluctuations obscure a price trend, leading to misallocation of 
resources. Price stabilisation measures often aim to stabilise both 
price and incomes, but unless the price elasticity of demand is less 
than one, this does not necessarily follow. Income stabilisation will 
stablise prices only if the demand curve is stable but inelastic and 
the supply curve shifts. If demand should be elastiC, income 
stabilisation will destabilise prices. Conversely, price stabilisation 
measures will destabilise income if the demand curve is elastic. 
Howeover, where price and income instability is due to large 
supply shifts, and the demand curve is nearly stationary and inelastiC, 
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guaranteed income schemes can achieve price and income stabilisation 
simultaneously. 
Suggested income stabilisation policies involve guaranteeing 
either producer prices or aggregate industry payouts, calculated as 
some function of past prices or industry incomes, with surplus funds 
diverted into a buffer acocunt. The relationship between aggregate and 
individual income stability is also discussed. 
Price and aggregate income stabilisation policies are 
alternatives, depending upon the problem to be overcome. Price 
stabilisation may guide reallocation of resources; income 
stabilisation may overcome problems caused by balance of payment 
variations where most of a crop is exported. If individual incomes are 
unstable, taxation and other policy measures would be more appropriate. 
The activities of the New Zealand Apple and Pear Board are 
considered in this context. In general, the guaranteed price scheme 
has overcome problems caused by instability of prices and income, but 
two further problems are identified: 
1. the guaranteed average price does not necessarily reflect the 
trend in actual average prices, leading to potential 
misallocation of resources; 
2. off-farm marketing costs, chiefly transport, are allocated by 
applying district differentials to various fruit growing 
districts. Changes in source of supply and/or markets have 
also lead to distortions in resource allocation. 
Ways of overcoming these problems are suggested. 
3.5 Control of Production and Price in Dutch Flower Bulb Growing 
• , ;. _ $ _ • ow •• 4 
Kortekaas, BMM 
Market regulations of horticultural products in the EEC have 
two aims: stabilising producers' incomes at an acceptable level, and 
stabilising volume of product. Both are achieved by stabilising the 
market price at producer level, either by controlling supply or by 
price intervention. In the Dutch flower bulb market, regulation 
involved production licencing by area, setting of intervention prices 
to be financed by a production levy, and exports tied to a minimum 
price. 
Production licences restrict the area cultivated, and 
intervention prices are intended to remove price effects of good and 
bad years. The intervention price is intended to just cover production 
costs, but this is difficult to measure. There are two criticisms: 
1. Distorted short-term incentives to production are incurred if 
the intervention price lies between the production cost and the 
variable costs. But in the long-term, the intervention price 
has to cover the total production cost. 
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2. Market intervention affects money turnover in the market, 
particularly in years of large production surpluses. The 
amount retained in the market by intervention was calculated by 
establishing regression equations for export and consumption of 
bulbs at two levels of price-inelasticity, when comparing 
market price and money turnover with and without intervention. 
It was demonstrated that in the years examined, turnover losses 
without market intervention would have been greater than the 
cost of intervention even at the least inelastic demand 
assumption, suggesting that without intervention, ruinous 
price-cutting would have occurrede 
Kortekaas' findings suggest that while price intervention is 
necessary it is not without shortcomings, such as 
production-encouraging effects, resentment among producers who are 
levied but may not use the intervention fund, and inflexibilitYe TWo 
ways to minimise these effects are: 
1. To offset production-encouraging effects, intervention in 
planting stock could be undertaken. This is only feasible if 
planting stock is a small part of total production, and if 
there is a clear separation between planting stock and saleable 
stock. The effect of buying up sufficient stock to ensure no 
expansion next year depends on price paid but could be 
considerably less than the cost of buying up surplus saleable 
bulbs resulting from increased plantings. Side effects noted 
are: price-increasing effects on the planting stock market, 
encouraged expansion of alternative crops with flow-on effects, 
and increased Quality of remaining planting stock with 
associated yield effects. 
2. 
3.6 
Another means 
would be to 
intervention 
hectare basis 
of offsetting production-encouraging effects 
assign rights to sell surplus stock to an 
fund. These rights could be allocated on a per 
and individual producers may either use the right 
or trade it to others. 
An Evaluation of a New Zealand Marketing Board's Supply 
Diversion Strategies ,ow QQ. ••• .¥ 4.$ 
$ .ua 
Rae, AN 
The performance of the New Zealand Apple and Pear Board as a 
monopolist in the domestic retail market is examined under two 
headings. Firstly, the diversion of supplies from the domestic retail 
market to processing markets; and secondly, the distribution of retail 
sales over the year through storage. Rae observes that the Board's 
policy is to benefit consumers and therefore pricing and storage 
strategy, while increasing total revenue, are not profit-maximisingc 
TWo hypotheses were tested: 
1. that the board seeks a policy which does not maximise net 
revenues; 
2. that a policy of price stability has increased consumer welfare 
above that obtainable under profit-maximising conditions 
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Total net revenue and consumer surpluses were estimated under 
three sets of conditions: 
1. actual Board pricing policy; 
2. profit-maximising policy if the Board acts as a monopolist; 
3. perfectly competitive conditions (quasi-competitive 
conditions). 
Estimates of total net revenues revealed a significant 
difference between actual Board policy and profit-maximising policy 
(significant at 10 percent or less in all years from 1968-75) 
suggesting that hypothesis 1 could not be rejected. 
Estimates 
showed that while 
under Board policy 
under Board policy 
percent. Therefore 
of consumer surplus under different pricing policies 
there were relatively small differences in surplus 
or quasi-competitive conditions, consumer surplus 
exceeded that under monopolistic pricing by 20-55 
hypothesis 2 also could not be rejected. 
Rae notes that although the difference between actual and 
maximised revenues is highly significant, the mean value represented 
only 10 percent of the Board's revenues; and by foregoing this, 
achieved an increase in consumer surplus of 40 percent. Differences 
between total net revenues under quasi-competitive and Board policy 
ranged from + 3 percent and were not generally significant; consumer 
surplus differences ranged from -9 percent to + 13 percent. 
Examination of supply diversion strategies included testing the 
hypotheses: 
1. the price of direct-sale apples is determined by the quantities 
allocated to processing by the Board; 
2. the volume of fresh sales is determined jointly by the 
pricing, direct sale prices, the price of substitute 
(pears), and personal incomes. 
Board 
fruits 
Net revenues were estimated for two years if 25 percent or 50 
percent less fresh fruit had been diverted to processing, giving higher 
fresh yolume and lower price. A loss in net revenues of $0.5 or $2 
million was indicated - a substantial effect on net trading profit. 
Rae concluded that the Board has not pursued a monopolistic 
pricing policy, and has achieved considerable gains for consumers at 
relatively small cost to growers. However, a near-perfectly 
competitive situation would achieve a similar outcome. Therefore the 
Board has had relatively little effect on prices by controlling fresh 
sale price, but diversion strategies have resulted in considerable 
short-term gains. Rae concludes that pricing policy has led to an 
increase in direct-sales volume, which reduces the Board's share of the 
fresh market. Direct sellers benefit from Board policy without sharing 
the cost of processing facilities. Also, the Board is 
producer-dominated; the level of transfer payment from consumer to 
producers is therefore decided by producers. 
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3.7 The Role and Performance of Statutory Marketing Organisations 
•• ,e De OU. '4 
Rae, AN 
This paper discusses the strategies that marketing boards often 
adopt in the pursuit of the objectives of maintaining or increasing 
prices and incomes received by producers, reducing fluctuations in such 
prices, and equalising market opportunities and returns among 
producers. The effectiveness of policies in pursuit of increased 
producer prices and incomes are considered under the following 
headings: 
1. by raising the level of on-farm demand; 
2,. by maximising returns from given levels of on-farm demands; 
3. by providing technical assistance to raise farm incomes; 
4e by enhancing the effectiveness of producers' bargaining power. 
The effectiveness of marketing board activities in stabilising 
prices and incomes, and in equalising market returns to producers, is 
also discussedG Rae reviews the findings of other workers and 
concludes that while marketing boards have typically experienced 
positive results in terms of integrating the activities of diverse farm 
and agribusiness firms, in marketing in a competitive environment, in 
achieving economies of size, in implementing market information 
services and grading standards, in achieving gains due to bargaining 
power and in the provision of technical services, many such gains could 
be achieved with alternative market structures and institutions. Areas 
in which marketing boards as such can be more successful than private 
industry include integration and co-ordination of production and 
marketing decisions, the use of bargaining power and possibly in export 
marketing. Rae suggests that other functions that Boards often carry 
out such as providing income support, stability and equity should be 
the concern of government. In order to clarify the role and value of 
agricultural marketing boards in New Zealand, it is suggested that 
several questions need to be addressed by economists. These include an 
examination of the nature and size of gains due to intergration and 
co-ordination that could not be achieved by a private market, and an 
evaluation of a monopoly exporter system versus a system of possibly 
licenced numerous exporting firms. Other issues to be addressed 
involve comparisons of the performance of marketing boards against 
other marketing institutions of comparable size in a similar market. 
SECTION 4 
MARKETING OPTIONS 
4.1 Getting Farm Products from Farm to Consumer: The System and 
the fssues ; W • eo 
Breimyer, HF 
American farmers feel cut off from marketing and also feel they 
are at its mercy, possibly because it is intangible, and maybe because 
it is a necessary 'evil' that can make the difference between a good 
return and a bad one. They also view marketing as the 'middleman'. 
Breimyer points out that so much misunderstanding calls for a 
description of what the marketing system does 'consist of. 
The system is big, it is mixed, and can be both efficient and 
inefficient. It is also where market powers converge and focus. The 
ultimate goals for marketing are set by society and include high 
operating efficiency, and enough competitiveness that prices will be 
fair to both consumers and producers. To achieve these goals, society 
desires a structure that will itself fulfil the performance goals set 
for it. For the system as a whole to work well, a firm's goals must be 
compatible with goals for the system. 
Describing the marketing system, Breimyer uses examples of 
returns, merchandising and concentration. In round terms marketers got 
two thirds of consumer food expenditures in 1975 and farmers one third. 
However, that approximate third may be misleading because Breimyer 
estimates that. 23 percent is actually returned to suppliers of farm 
inputs, which leaves the farmer with 12 percent of food expenditures. 
There is an increasing part of the marketing system that is industrial, 
where merchandising dominates. Farm products are highly processed, 
sold by brand name and advertised, with usually a high marketing margin 
and comparatively low returns to the farmer. Unprocessed products such 
as livestock, dairy and poultry are sold with minimum processing and 
merchandising cost and effort. This product-oriented marketing returns 
a large share of the consumer's dollar to producers. 
Highly processed products tend to also have highly concentrated 
industry (high percentage of output by few firms). For example, one 
extreme is breakfast cereals with 90 percent of output by the four 
largest firms, while in meat packing the equivalent figure is only 22 
percent. Also the distribution of retail price differs: for breakfast 
cereals farmers got 10 cents of the consumer's dollar, and for broilers 
they got 54 cents. Breimyer feels that the marketing of breakfast 
cereals is too costly, especially since advertising costs are twice 
that of the actual raw material. 
In concluding, the author states how the farmer's marketing of 
differs so much from the rest of the marketing system past 
He goes on to suggest ways that farmers can relate their 
better to the system as a whole. More responsive pricing 
vertical integration, countervailing power (co-operatives), 
his product 
the farm. 
marketing 
systems, 
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price supports and assured market outlets are illustrations of these 
methods. 
4.2 Horticultural Marketing Co-operatives: the Scope for Large 
S"caTe urg-an"t'satroti' #4i • ... •• :'4# 
......... 
Kirk, JH~ Ellis, PG 
Chapters ewo and three outline the present structure of 
horticultural marketing co-operatives in the UK, and general arguments 
for and against associative arrangements. 
The objectives of co-operatives have to be considered in 
relation to the circumstances of the country. In the United Kingdom, 
horticultural co-operatives supply 11 percent of the commodity markets. 
Sales on open market are still the dominant form of disposal. The 
United Kingdom is a relatively small country, with a temperate climate, 
and producing and consuming areas are well intermixed. Therefore 
transport and storage have not represented major concerns to producers. 
Various forms of associative arrangements are discussed, 
including second-tier co-operatives, mergers and consultative or 
sharing arrangements. Most of the advantages of associative 
arrangements consist of economies of scale in selling. Economies of 
pooled purchasing are exhausted at a level of 20-30 growers. Larger 
organisations can better organise technical services to producers, and 
enable continuity of supply, market presence and presentation to be 
maintained, while reducing uneven distribution of product through 
markets. Transport costs can also be reduced, although there appears 
to be little to gain from large rather than small organisations up to 
the pOint of the packinghouse. 
Because of the allocative tasks of large organisations, 
management at second-tier level is likely to have access to more market 
information, and be better equipped to appraise it than management at 
first tier level. Management skills can be distributed over a wider 
range of produce, which is beneficial if managers are adequate to their 
task. An improved flow of technical information concerning cultivar 
selection, production, markets and prices resulting from mobilising and 
pooling information is the principal economy available to larger 
organisations. 
If the market share held by a co-operative organisation in a 
commodity sector is relatively small, the degree of organisation among 
producers will have only marginal effects on market power. There is 
more to be gained by meeting buyers' requirements than by negotiating 
better terms. 
Disadvantages associated with larger organisations include: 
1. loss of immediacy at first-tier level. where marketing 
decisions for some products need to be made quickly. 
2. risk of developing a bureaucratic and unwieldly administration. 
3. dilution of producer support, involvement and control. 
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4. loss of autonomy at first-tier level. 
The advantages and disadvantages of large-scale organisation 
carry different weights depending on the commodity ~oncerned. Less 
perishable crops, with precise product specification (implying 
concentration among buyers), and concentration of growing areas, are 
better suited to marketing through large organisations. Highly 
perishable crops which are sensitive to weather and have widely 
dispersed production, packing and selling points, should be marketed in 
a less centralised mannere 
4.3 Integrated Horticultural Production and Marketing 
¥ •• $ • t •• _ 4 
Taylor, WR 
This paper describes the co-ordination of crop production and 
distribution to meet customers' requirements in an industry operating 
under generally unstable and unprotected producer prices. Reference to 
outdoor salad and vegetable crops is made. A number of changes in the 
producers environment are outlined such as increased crop yield, 
improved crop management techniques, location further away from cities 
due to improved transport, competition from imports, an increase in 
chain supermarkets and decline in independent retailers, and an 
increase in prepackaging. "These changes mean that producers must be 
effiCient, flexible, and aggressive to both retain and expand customer 
accounts." 
Before producers' interests can be co-ordinated within a group 
it is imperative that the company's directors assess the potential of 
the present plans of major growers and how these may fit into a 
co-operative marketing plan. 
In the ideal situation producers should only establish the 
volume of crops required by their customers. However, climatic 
conditions may often affect yields, so technical staff are required to 
plant seed type, plant density, disease control, fertiliser levels, 
rotational patterns and spread of crops over geographical areas and 
soil types. Thus continuity of supply to customers is maintained. 
Specialist marketing staff are also required for feedback of wide 
ranging and changing customer requirements. The author concludes that 
"business is likely to remain ruthlessly competitive in the foreseeable 
future and intense pressure will remain upon co-operative marketing and 
technical staff, both from their customers and members who rightly 
argue that the overhead costs of production are not being recovered in 
the present market structure." 
4.4 Marketing Options for Farmers 
. . .. 
Forker, D 
Forker outlines examples in the marketing systems of various 
agricultural products where farmers are dissatisfied with price-quality 
mechanisms operating. He asks the question; "Is there a better way?" 
(for farmers to market their products). The expectations of farmers, 
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agribusiness and consumers are described and the implications of these 
expectations discussed. 
The farmer expects the best possible price from a system that 
treats him and his fellow producers equitably. He also expects 
adequate prices in view of production costs, and adequate rewards for 
his contribution of capital, labour and management. Lastly he expects 
personal freedom as an entrepreneur (or the OPtions to make decisions). 
Small agribusiness firms probably have the same expectations as 
farmers. Large agribusiness firms are concerned about maximiSing 
profits and growth. Consumers expect adequate supplies of all major 
food items at stable price levels and a food system that is efficient, 
accountable, and responsive to their desires and complaints. 
The implications of these expectations is that a marketing 
process cannot be all things to all people. Thus farmers considering 
new marketing alternatives must propose a system that meets their 
aspirations as well as those of agribusiness. Alternatively the system 
must give farmers enough muscle to withstand the economic and politcal 
power of agribusinesse The system must also meet the aspirations of 
consumers or face the possibility of political defeat. 
Forker goes on to propose eleven marketing options that he 
considers worthy of consideration. The first four are institutional 
changes designed to make an open free market work better. They include 
"electronic commodity markets" that use telecommunications and/or 
computers to bring large numbers of buyers and sellers together. 
"Vertical co-ordination through forward contracting" would help to 
determine a 'fairer' price. "Forward deliverable contract markets" 
would establish a formal market for production contracts, and 
"mandatory public reporting of market information" is also a 
pre-requiSite of a competitive private market economy. 
The next five options are designed to close or limit markets 
and to exercise some degree of control over marketing and/or prices. 
"Exclusive agency bargaining!! would involve farmers of a certain 
commodity voting to decide whether they wanted to form a bargaining 
unit. "Joint ventures between agricultural co-operative and 
non-co-operative marketing firms" and "vertical integration through 
ownership" would involve farmers more in the physical process, but must 
be carefully evaluated as to the benefits/costs. "Marketing orders" 
could be improved in a number of ways (Forker gives ten examples). 
"Marketing boards" are suggested as a solution to grain export 
problems, provided they are set up so as not to raise domestic prices 
and interfere with current agribusiness firms operations. 
The last two options are sweeping and represent two extremes. 
The first, "Fine turning" says "Lets do a better job with the legal 
authority that now exists" and the second, "Industrial Restructuring" 
says "Lets pass stronger anti-trust legislation and break the large 
corporations (where business is too concentrated) into smaller units 
for greater competition~" 
Forker concludes by saying that the present US marketing system 
should not be condemned. He says it functions more efficiently than 
any other in the world. The question "Is there a better way?" is the 
reason for this and should be continued to be asked, as well as 
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considering the complaints, the desires and the options. 
4.5 Marketing Alternatives and Resource Allocation: Case Studies 
Of' cor1ective 'Bargaining·· 4.p ; - - •• 4 4 
•• •• * 4 *.C.4 
Lang, MG 
This paper examines case studies of contract revisions prompted 
by collective bargaining, analyses their resource allocation 
consequences, and offers an explanation of why those revisions did not 
come about in the absence of collective bargaining. It concludes that 
the revisions led to a reduction in joint costs of production and 
processing and argues that collective bargaining was one of several 
factors that may have prompted contract revisions. 
These findings support the claim that there are fundamental 
differences in the resource allocation consequences of alternative 
vertical co-ordination mechanisms. They do not permit a conclusion 
that collective bargaining is necessarily a desirable alternative. 
They do offer evidence that one dimension of co-ordination may be 
improved through collective action. 
4.6 Bold Steps Farmers can take through their Organisations to 
Iiii'prove= 'Mar'k:ettrig"· • , - .... 
»4iIiiIIIWi p *.W 
Jaenke, EA 
The experience of approximately 10 southwest Kansas wheat 
farmers is outlined from the pOint of their decision to find a 
'specialist' to market their wheat. They approached a Kansas 
co-operative that handles a good share of the wheat in Kansas and 
Colorado. Consequently the author's firm and the executives of the 
co-operative got together to develop a more sophisticated wheat 
marketing program. Economic analysis of production patterns, quality, 
transportation, and historical factors was carried out, as well as a 
review of marketing pools that had been tried in other agricultural 
commodities. 
They concluded that specialists do a better job of marketing 
than farmers. Also, there is an advantage in selling large quantities 
both in terms of market power and market efficiency in meeting 
customers needs. This pool type program has the advantage of early and 
long term sales commitments, and reliable supplies for markets. The 
farmer commits his crop at planting time to be delivered to the 
marketing pool. The manager of the marketing pool can rationalise 
harvesting by regions and transportation. The farmers gain the margin 
available at the former middleman level, because the pool does not make 
a profit. By covering a large area, crop failures are not likely to 
have a major effect on the pool. The author concludes by saying that 
usually the various pools in existence have shown a gain to the farmer. 

CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSES OF MARKETING PERPFORMANCE 
5.1 Markets and Prices in Today's Agricultural Economy #. ;» ,» •• ,. 0* 
Breimyer, HF 
Professor Breimyer considers various definitions of price and 
offers his own, that price is the "culmination of negotiating between 
sovereign entities, definitely not performed under duress, resulting 
in the transfer of entitlement to a good or service". He suggests that 
the main feature of a market system is the sovereignty of traders, and 
that for a market system to fulfill welfare criteria, equity or 
equivalent bargaining power must also exist. Subunits within a 
vertically integrated organisation do not possess sovereignty, and 
goods are transferred within the organisation at shadow prices rather 
than true prices. 
Secondly, in a market system, price must dominate all other 
elements in a transaction. This does not occur in agricultural 
marketing systems, where price of farm products is highly significant 
to farmers, but not necessarily the most significant element to 
processors. 
An idealised price-powered market is of the marketing clearing 
variety. Much of today's price system is based on administered price, 
which requires that the price-setter has market power. As well as its 
distributive function, price is also required to allocate factors of 
production and determine the distribution of income generated. There 
is no justification for assuming that the distributive efficiency of 
price automatically means efficient factor allocation and income 
distribution. 
Breimyer proposes three necessary conditions if a price-powered 
market is to be relied upon: 
1. Sovereignty of the economic unit 
2. Relatively easy access to physical resources on 
non-discriminatory terms 
3. IndiVidual production techniques as the ultimate equaliser of 
income distribution, i.e. constant returns to scale. 
When these conditions prevail, marginal cost pricing genuinely 
attaches a product price consistent with costs of production and 
minimises rent (producer surplus). The more these conditions are 
violated, the steeper the slope of the aggregate cost curve, and the 
greater is the proportion of rent. Therefore, the steeper the slope of 
the cost curve, the more socially unacceptable is marketing pricing as 
a force of income distribution. 
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Depletion of resources such as fossil fuels, metals and 
farmland results in sharply increasing cost curves, which under 
marginal cost pricing yields very high rent returns to established 
sectors of each industry. It is suggested that in this situation, 
Keynsian-type fiscal stimulation adds little to productivity but a 
great deal to the asset value of resources, which in the case of 
farmland can make land holding more attractive than land operating. 
Because the second condition is increasingly violated, the role of 
price will decline as a means of guiding sectors of the economy which 
are sensitive to depletable resource use, including agriculture. 
5.2 ricultural Selling Cartels: Relative Co-operator and 
Non-co-opertor a~ns 
• ace 
Piggott, RR 
Supply-restricting agricultural selling cartels often benefit 
non-co-operating producers more than co-operatorsc It should therefore 
be recognised that producer-controlled marketing boards are not always 
suitable to all marketing situations. 
Conventional economic analysis suggests that a supply 
restricting cartel will inevitably fail 1f non-eo-operating producers 
are present, assuming that co-operators and non-co-operators have 
identical cost structures. However, some cartels survive, suggesting 
that this assumption is inadequate. Piggott suggests that the 
co-operation of a producer depends on the ratio of benefits he would 
receive by co-operation to those received if he did not, and that the 
parameters of the frequency distribution of this ratio could provide a 
means of predicting the long-run stability of a cartel. 
In a supply-restricting cartel, the price elasticity of demand 
confronting the cartel will generally be more elastic than total 
demand. Co-operator and non-co-operator gains will be greater the 
greater the reduction in cartel supply and the less elastic is total 
demand. Gains to co-operators or non-eo-operators increase with each 
groupFs supply elasticity. But co-operator gains are negatively 
affected by non-co-operator supply elasticity while the reverse 
situation does not occur. Therefore total gains will be less as the 
proportion of total demand met by non-co-operators increases. 
The cartel which can provide greater average gains to 
co-operators than those received by non-co-operators as a result of 
supply restriction has a greater chance of survival in the long run. 
The above analysis, applies to cartels which are price-makers 
and restrict supply by imposing quotas. Restriction by supply 
diversion and input restriction, and other price setting arrangements 
are also examined. 
The application of economic theory to determine the economic 
feasibility of a proposal to establish a marketing board is considered, 
and important parameters for use in feasibility studies are outlined. 
There are: the price elasticity of demand for the product concerned, 
the price elasticities of co-operator and non-co-operator supplies, the 
ratio of average co-operator to non-co-operator output, and the 
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proportionate reduction in supply proposed by the cartel. 
For some combinations of parameters~ non-co-operator gains 
would outweigh co-operator gains~ which would encourage co-operators to 
leave the cartel. Compulsory membership would be necessary to ensure 
its survival. However, voluntary cartels can also offer benefits to 
co-operators which would lift their net returns above those of 
non-co-operators. 
Whether or not a voluntary agricultural cartel will survive can 
therefore only be determined after a study of the key parameters for 
each case. 
5.3 Evaluating the Performance of Agricultural Markets 
.. « $ • O£ t 4 
Hill, LD 
A long-term trend exists of substituting administrative 
controls for free market forces, either by changes in market structure 
or government involvement. This results in market concentration either 
of corporations or government agencies. A free market would not meet 
the needs of modern US agriculture. It therefore is important to 
determine the effects of public and private actions which move the 
market along a continuum between free market and administered price 
systems. 
Corporate control of markets is premised on the statement that 
large organisations require planning, which in turn requires corporate 
control of market forces. Hill challenges this statement and suggests 
that planning is also necessary for small firms; and that the 
difference between large and small firms is their ability to use market 
power to avoid the consequences of planning mistakes. Means of 
escaping the discipline of the market include manipulating consumer 
preference, transfer of losses to other products, exclusion of 
substitutes in the markets, and use of political influence. Corporate 
control of markets cannot guarantee efficient and profitable operations 
unless economic power extends to control of consumers and substitutes. 
In Agriculture, government is increasingly involved in providing an 
equivalent to corporate control of the market. Government policy 
actions, which are often based on ideological rather than economic 
principles, have economic consequences which are seldom clearly 
identified. The- cumulative effect of policy action on world markets in 
terms of trade barriers, cartels etc has caused further reliance on 
government and less on market forces, but there is a general lack of 
means to evaluate the effect of government action in terms of net 
welfare. Economists by evaluating market performance could identify 
trade-offs between various policy alternatives. Hill proposes an 
evaluative procedure which could achieve this: 
1. A policy action is separated into the specific marketing 
functions which could be affected. 
2. Criteria are identified on which policy should be judged. 
3. Policy is analysed in terms of ability to move in relation to 
goals implied by the criteria. 
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Hill suggests four criteria and applies them to the US and 
Canadian grain industries as follows: 
Ie Efficiency, i.e. the performance of basic marketing functions 
at lowest resource cost. However, it is noted that while 
market discipline enforces operating efficiency, the private 
cost of investment losses should not be ignorede 
2. Price level and price stability. The role of price is to 
allocate goods and resources in a market. However, these can 
also be allocated by government. Marketing boards do not 
always increase farm prices; for example the Canadian grain 
marketing boards have not gained any consistent premium for 
producers over the prices received in the US for grains. 
However, marketing boards can stabilise prices. 
3. Response of changing demand and supply_ Responses to even 
small price signals is rapid in the US grain industry, which 
has large numbers of individual producers, but market board 
systems often have difficulty responding to fluctuating demand 
and can lose market shares as a resulte 
40 Incentives to increase production. Policies can influence 
yields and associated production cost. The free market has a 
clear advantage in terms of rapid production response, but as 
it can result in over praduction it is not clear whether a 
controlled or free market is more efficiente 
Hill concludes that substitution of administered decision 
making for market forces will tend to increase price stability, 
decrease marketing efficiency, decrease resource responsiveness, and 
have little effect on price levels in the US grain industry. He 
acknowledges that there are objectives of society which cannot be met 
through a free market system, but suggests that because of diversity of 
opinion, government policy will move towards increased welfare for 
producers and consumers very slowly, if at aIle 
5 .. 4 There is Method in my Madness: or is it Vice Versa? Measuring 
agrtculturaI Hartet Fertormance· • • 
4 PI. 6 pee A • 
Harriss, B 
A number of studies of research into developing countries' 
economics of agricultural marketing are reviewed. The methodology used 
is usually "structure, conduct, performance" analYSiS, which is a 
standard tool for market analysis in the USA and UK. Market structure 
consists of the characteristics of the organisation of a market which 
influences the nature of competition and pricing (degree of buyer and 
seller concentration, entry conditions etc). Market conduct is the 
pattern of behaviour which enterprises follow in adapting to the 
markets in which they sell or buy (price determination methods, sales 
promotion, competing tactics etc). Market performance represents the 
economic results of structure and conduct (relationship between 
distributive margins and costs of marketing services, and time series 
price data to show degree of competition in marketing systems). 
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The author concludes that the majority of the studies reviewed 
"display a serious lack of logical relationship between the data 
presented and the conclusions derived". The conclusions drawn are 
confusing and more research along structure, conduct, performance lines 
will only resolve this confusion if it is consistent. 
"The polar assumption that markets are either perfectly 
competitive or monopolistic is clearly false ••• ", and "a competitive 
market may be necessary but it is clearly not sufficient for the 
maximisation of productivity." The author finishes by concluding "A 
question mark must be placed not simply beside the methodology of 
conventional agricultural marketing economics in the structure, 
conduct, performance tradition, but also beside the history of the 
interpretation of the results." 

SECTION 6 
THE EXPORT MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
6.1 The Agricultural Marketing Agenda for the Eighties 
¥ • 4 a 0 4» 0_4.. ..... 4 4 
Ward, RW 
Marketing research is directed by changes in the marketing 
environment. Four areas of change are: 
1. Changes in supply and demand conditions such as the economic 
environment, and consumer preferences. 
2. Increasing need for an international perspective on trade. 
3. Business research may be 
confidentiality prohibits 
researcher. 
less attractive if 
recognition and 
the need 
rewards to 
for 
the 
4. Changes in the support base (funding) will influence the 
content and orientation of research. 
Changes to consumer preferences have led to more processing and 
more away-from-home consumption, with consequent restructuring of the 
distribution system. 
Changes to the economic environment include further 
concentration in the producing sector, with factor and product markets 
becoming "thin"; increasing US reliance on world markets; with 
changes from a situation of chronic agricultural surpluses to one of 
limited supplies. Global demand for food products could expand to near 
record rates; while global food production could contract to 75 
percent of historical rates. Few countries will be able to support 
their increased consumption. 
Marketing research requirements are 
following headings: 
discussed under the 
1. The Pricing Process - including further theoretical analysis of 
thin markets, forward markets and electronic markets. 
2. Transportation and Distribution Systems - including analysis of 
structural changes. 
3. Institutional Changes - including further studies of marketing 
orders, co-operatives, trading associations, and marketing 
boards as the institutional mechanism for international trade. 
4. Market Concentration the structure and performance of 
agricultural markets, their effect on price and economic 
welfare, and measures of economic performance of increasingly 
concentrated organisation. 
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5. Information Controls promotion programs, and the 
communication process in generalG 
The author concludes that with increasing demands on supplies 
and distributional services, communication becomes more crucial, and 
the researcher should provide communication leadership. 
6.2 Exporting Problems and Organisational Structures 
• ...4 40= 44.C 0 .#04 4 
Rae, AN 
A summary of current trends in international trade in 
horticultural products is presented, including: 
1. 
2. 
Increasing protectionism in horticultural 
particularly from the EEC and Japan; 
Increasing export availability of horticultural 
indicating reduced export prices in the medium run; 
products, 
products, 
3. Institutional changes by other countries to strengthen their 
market presence. 
The New Zealand horticultural export industry is examined. 
Data presented show that 75 percent of revenue is earned by apples and 
kiwifruit, 63 percent of sales (by value) is handled by three firms, 
and 80 percent of revenue is derived from only four market regions. 
Rae suggests that exports of kiwifruit and apples are relatively well 
organised, and it is the minor products which are experiencing 
problems. Features and problems of minor product exporting include: 
little formal integration or agreements between producers and 
exporters; 
some weaker buying and s~111ng strategies due to market 
uncertainties; 
use of foreign selling agents; 
some co-operation and some competition in transport; 
lack of commitment and/or resources for effective promotion, 
research and development; 
lack of long term market intelligence and information on new 
markets. 
Rae discusses the structure and organisation of firms in the 
horticultural marketing channel under the headings of co-ordination, 
competition and conflict~ Co-ordination of channel members to optimise 
benefits may be poorly served by the price mechanism, because of 
imbalance of power and noisy signals. Other co-ordinating mechanisms 
may be necessary, such as co-operatives, contractual agreements, 
voluntary jOint ventures and other forms of horizontal and vertical 
integration are considered. 
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Gains from competition are likely to be shared between the 
producing country and its markets, unless exporters agree to 
co-ordinate activities in overseas markets, while continuing to compete 
on the domestic market. Rae suggests that the "weak seller" is not 
necessarily rational in Quitting product at a lower price, but may not 
have the resources, market strength or information to successfully 
participate in the market. He recommends that a single-seller approach 
to exporting is desirable. 
Conflicts within channels are caused by different goals and 
different power bases of channel members, and can impair economic 
performance of the channel as a whole. Conflict medication is best 
carried out by independent committees such as the Horticultural Export 
Development committee, with a view to meeting channel goals rather than 
firm-specific goals. 
The paper concludes by speculating on the future role of 
existing large exporters with regard to minor products. These firms 
may have little commitment to minor products, may not make marketing 
decisions in the best interests of minor exporters, and may suffer 
reduced efficiency if they do become less specialised. If so, joint 
programs among specialist exporters of minor products may develop. Rae 
suggests that the trend to increasing speCialisation, emergence of few 
firms with large turnovers, and jOint programs between these firms will 
result in the formation of a single producer controlled exporting 
organisation dominating the horticultural industry in New Zealand. 

SECTION 7 
ECONOMIC AND MARKETING THEORY 
7.1 The Economic~ of Agricultural Marketing: A Survey 
_i $ _ ... _ P, 4 _ .•• 
Breimyer, HF 
Three different schools present definitions of agricultural 
marketing. The first, Breimyer calls the "What happens" school 
derived from the economics of the farm business, it defines marketing 
as all that happens to products past the farm. The second school 
extends this definition to include marketing as the seat of 
co-ordination and direction of economic activity, and the third school 
focuses more on the processes of cultivating demand rather than on farm 
products, as they enter the market stream ('market development' 
school) • 
These three schools of thought on marketing can be traced back 
to different origins. The "what happens" school originated where 
marketing was regarded as a mere extension of the farm business. Farm 
management was one of its progenitors. Neo-classical economic thought 
then hastened the emergence of the co-ordinating-role school of 
thought. The market development approach to marketing was derived 
partly from depression-born Keynesianism and latterly to the success of 
business schools in elevating merchandising ('marketing') to an 
academic discipline. 
The economies of collective action in agricultural marketing 
has a long history. Both farmers and consumers have embraced 
co-operatives in the past to correct apparent marketing ills. Breimyer 
describes the various works that compare co-operatives to business 
enterprises, as well as those commenting on horizontal and vertical 
integration by co-operatives. The techniques of management (or lack 
of) of co-operatives have also been written about, as has the concept 
of the suitability of co-operatives as 'adaptive' institutions. 
Mandated co-operation is examined in the form of marketing orders and 
boards, and lastly collective bargaining is discussed as a means to 
establish price and other terms of delivery. 
1. 
Efficiency in marketing is discussed in terms of: 
how well the system 
proceeds and, 
allocates resources and distributes 
2. the operational efficiency of individual market organisations. 
Breimyer states that after a half century of analysis there is 
no consensus as to the best method for examining the 
allocative-distributional operations of the marketing system. Usually 
only one aspect of the multi-faceted system is selected for analysis, 
often on the basis of an accusation of malfunctioning. Commodity price 
analysis concentrates on the supply, demand and price of farm products. 
It remains mostly predictive. Studies of marketing costs and margins 
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are both simple and sophisticated, and usually arise from the age old 
notion that middlemen extract too much profit. Breimyer rounds off his 
survey of the studies of efficiency in marketing by commenting that 
such studies often move rather hastily into the economics of imperfect 
competition e This usually embraces concentration in each industry and 
the extent of product differentiation that prevails. He goes on to 
discuss in this area; concentration in markets, product 
differentiation, the price-discovery mechanism, vertical integration, 
structure-conduct-performance and game theory. 
The second area of efficiency in marketing relates to the 
operating efficiency of the 'firm' e Efficiency relates output to 
input, but quantifying these is difficulte Recognising that choices 
exist between resources (inputs) and products (outputs) also 
complicates matterSe Moreover, is efficiency to be judged in terms of 
the 'firm' or of society? 
The area of demand creation and market development is discussed 
mainly from United States references and concerns those private and 
public policies that arise from either over production of farm products 
or under nutrition of a market segmente Supplemental food programmes 
for low income consumers which directly distribute food or allocate 
multiple prices to it, have been studied more and more in recent years. 
Consumer Preference Studies are a product of post-war activity in farm 
product marketing 1n the United States and a mass of literature is 
available. Data can be related to upgrading standards for raw farm 
products» possible product differentiation and possible new products. 
The results of research into the effectiveness of consumer-oriented 
advertising and promotion is eagerly sought after by various commodity 
organisations and food processors. Broad results are that the more 
distinctive a product, the more shiftable is the demand curve. Also, 
superior goods are more responsive to advertising than inferior goods. 
Transportation and regional economics as an aspect of 
agricultural marketing originated fairly early (Von Thunen, 1875). The 
majority of regional econ~mic studies were simulated, that is, models. 
As long as transport costs approximated actual costs, Breimyer 
considered these models could be regarded as marketing studies. 
The final area of discussion in Breimyer's review is about 
macro-structural studiese He considers that it is really only in the 
last decade that economists have ventured into overviews of major 
sectors of the marketing system - or of the entire system. They 
invariably seek to define (or re-define) the role of government. 
Pressure of recent events (e.g. the European Common Market) is the 
main reason Breimyer thinks these studies have come about. He also 
thinks that the knowledge from these studies needs to be amalgamated to 
guide the structuring or restructuring of markets. He asks for 
solutions to the questions "How well does the contemporary system work, 
and what are the problems, and the aspirations for the future?" 
Breimyer also cautions about being too comprehensive in terms 
of macro-studies of marketing, especially when looking at developed and 
developing countries~ "In large measure institutions of marketing are 
time-dynamic and culture-specific" .. 
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7.2 Economic Theory of Bargaining in Agriculture 
.4 • , t • • ... 
HeImberger, GP and Hoos, S 
The authors consider the bargaining environment for 
agricultural commodities and its participants, and some theoretical 
approaches to bargaining. Without a bargaining association, the 
industry is characterised on the selling side by atomistic competition 
and free entry. A bargaining association of individual producers can 
become a dominant seller, depending on the size of the market segment 
and controls. 
With the introduction of a bargaining association into the 
structure of a market, there is a need to develop a theoretical basis 
for describing the relationship between the structure, its conduct and 
performance. The authors consider several approaches, including 
bilateral monopoly theory, and two game-theory solutions in which 
Pareto-optimality and other criteria are required in the outcome. 
However, some aspects of reality, such as ignorance, uncertainty, 
aspirations and judgements of the bargaining parties have been assumed 
away, and therefore the relationship between structure and performance 
has not yet been adequately defined. 
Some economic implications of co-operative bargaining and its 
potential for price enhancement are considered in two cases: in the 
short run with fixed membership; and in the long run with membership 
allowed to adjust to induced market changes. In the first case, price 
enhancement will follow only if price elasticities of demand and 
non-member supply, and member output: total output ratios achieve 
certain values. Non-members will also benefit from the price-enhancing 
effect of association. 
In the second case, long-run membership will be influenced by 
the distribution of short-run benefits. There is an incentive for 
members to withdraw from the association without loss of benefits, 
unless there are a few large firms who recognise their interdependence 
and hold the association together, or there is an industry-wide 
government programme. 
Therefore, long run price enhancement via co-operative 
bargaining requires some monopolistic or monopsonistic elements to 
succeed. The paper concludes that co-operative bargaining associations 
have a useful role for certain markets and certain products, e.g. 
processing fruits and vegetables, fluid milk, sugar beets, but that 
this role is limited. 
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SECTION 8 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
The literature indicates that unorganised agricultural markets 
are characterised by: 
1. Long-run surpluses of some products, often as a result of price 
interventions by government; 
2. Low rates of growth in aggregate demand due to low or zero 
population growth; 
3. Relatively low price and income elasticities of demand on the 
domestic market; 
4. Relatively high price elasticities of supply; 
5. Wide fluctuations in price inherent in the imbalance in rate of 
growth of demand and supply, and low price elasticity of 
demand; 
6. Large numbers 
intermediates. 
of producers and consumers with few 
Many authors appear to have assumed that unsatisfactory returns 
to the agricultural sector are a consequence of marketing deficiencies. 
However, TK Warley (1967) challenges the proposition that inadequate 
incomes in agriculture are caused by marketing deficiences, and 
suggests that low returns to resources are due instead to 
yield-increasing technological advances, low price and income 
elasticities of demand, and inadequate rates of movement of labour away 
from agriculture. He contends that while agricultural market systems 
are not perfect, they have some of the characteristics of efficient 
marketing, in that profits, margins and costs are all kept fairly low 
by competition. However, he acknowledges that ambiguous price signals, 
price instability, perishability of product and distribution costs are 
a problem, and some intervention by government or organised producer 
groups may be beneficial. 
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PART TWO 
SECTION 9 
FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE MARKET STRUCTURE 
Market structure consists of the "characteristics of the 
organisation of a market which seem to influence strategically the 
nature of competition and pricing within the market" (Bain, 1959). 
These include the ease of entry to and exit from the market, the degree 
of seller and buyer concentration and their organisation into 
vertically and horizontally integrated forms, and the extent of product 
differentiation. 
Some factors which determine market structure are as follows: 
9.1 Distribution of Market Power 
_ow ' •• 7444. £4'.4. 
In unorganised agricultural markets, the optimal plant size of 
processors and handlers results in relatively few of these first-level 
intermediaries being necessary to absorb the output of a large number 
of producers. Market strength is closely related to the volume traded 
in any prOduct, and the outcome of this imbalance is that the 
first-level intermediaries become the price-makers in the market. The 
producer and consumer, having both the greatest numbers and least 
bargaining· power, are the price takers. While price is highly 
significant to the producer, it may not be the most significant element 
of the transaction to the processor or handler; therefore voluntary 
horizontal intergration by producers to exert countervailing power 
results in the formation of various associative arrangements. 
Montigaud et al (1978) contend that market organisation follows 
a distinct process, from the voluntary grouping of producers of a 
commodity as outlined above, through enlargement of the organisation, 
eventual compulsory membership and international co-ordination,_ to 
vertical integration encompassing shipping, wholesaling and processing. 
Highly evolved forms of market organisation depend on, although are not 
necessarily associated with, high levels of economiC development. 
9.2 Price Formation Processes 
..... .. .v. _= ... _c.e •• 
The necessary concentration of first-level intermediaries 
favours the substitution of an administratively determined price for 
the market price. The activities of large private organisations in the 
market can have an effect similar to that of government intervention. 
Large investments encourage the firm to increase its control over the 
market to minimise risk. Hill (1982) suggests that large organisations 
can (and do) use their market power to escape the discipline of the 
market in the event of planning mistakes. Means of doing this include 
manipulating consumer preference by advertising, transfer of losses to 
other products, exclusion of substitutes·from the market, and use of 
political infuence. Price-setting behaviour such as thiS, whether 
originating from government or private organisations in a market, can 
move the market along a continuum between free market and administered 
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price systems c 
903 Infrastructural Needs 
'4 .•• , MU • 
Where producing and consuming areas are separated, either by 
distance or time, terminal markets in which the price clears the market 
may not meet the needs of modern agricultural industry. The need for 
storage, preservation and transport generates a requirement for an 
infrastructure which can copeo This in turn is likely to be provided 
only by large organisations, such as producer groups or co-operativesc 
9c4 Changing Patterns of Demand 
• • 
Increasing requirements for further processing, as a result of 
changing consumption patterns and income levels as well as separation 
of markets, have led to further changes in the composition of market 
channels 0 
SECTION 10 
~TING ORGANISATIONS 
All of the statutory organisations and associative arrangements 
of producers 
increasing 
fluctuations 
returns among 
have in common the general objectives of maintaining or 
prices and incomes received by producers, reducing 
in such prices, and equalising market opportunities and 
producers. In pursuit of these objectives, Warley (1967) 
two strategies can be adopted: suggests that 
1. On-farm demand can be raised by: 
-
a) raising consumer demand through market research and 
penetration, promotion and advertising programs; 
b) identifying sub-demands and meeting them through 
quality control, grading and storage; 
c) raising derived demand by reducing marketing margins, 
through vertical integration and rationalised 
distribution or processing channels. 
2. Returns from given on-farm demand can be maximised by: 
a) long-run supply restriction uSing Quotas and production 
licences; 
b) short-run supply restriction through support buying and 
holding of stocks, or diversion or destruction of 
product: 
c) discriminating marketing via price differentiation in 
sub-markets to equalise revenues. 
Means of stabilising income from given demand include: 
1. price support schemes, often self-funded through buffer funds. 
Alternatively, price intervention can be financed from producer 
levies or direct assistance from government; 
2. supply management, using the same means as for long- and 
short-run supply restriction, but with the intention of evening 
out the flow of product on to a market rather than simply 
restricting its volume. 
Other income enhancing strategies are described by Rae (1981) 
as: 
1. provision of technical assistance, often in the form of 
advisory services giving information and guidance on cultivar 
selection and production technology, but also in product and 
market research; 
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2. 
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policies which increase the 
bargaining power; 
effectiveness of producers' 
3. quality assurance including specification of size and weight, 
packing and quality of produce; 
4. provision of market intelligence to channel members; 
promotion of research programs. 
and 
10.1 Statutory Marketing Organisations 
• " ¥ -::pow $0 4 e $ Q .......... 
10.1.1 Marketing Boards and Marketing Authorities 
.» us¥.c _* 4 4' .. 
Marketing boards have been described as "compulsory producer 
co-operatives" and have been employed in the regulation of agricultural 
product markets in England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, West 
Africa, Israel and the Netherlands. Some but not all boards derive 
their authority from enabling legislation, and most were initially set 
up to aid in economic recovery in the 1930'se The objectives of 
marketing boards, as outlined by Veeman (1979) can be generally stated 
in terms of improvement in the level and stability of producer returns, 
transfer of the balance of market power towards producers~ and 
reduction in the degree of market uncertainty faced by producers. 
These generalised objectives also hold for marketing orders and other 
forms of associative arrangement, although differing structures, origin 
of board appointees and source of authority all determine the extent to 
which such organisations engage in these activities. 
Abbott and Creupelandt (1966) classified marketing boards as 
follows: 
1. Non-Trading Boards 
........ ow,. 
a) advisory and promotional boards, which engage in market 
research and promotional activities; 
b) regulatory boards which monitor quality assurance and 
packing standards; 
c) price stabilisation boards, which engage in supply 
management and/or price fixing and deficiency payments. 
2. Trading Boards 
au Q •• 
a) price stabilisation boards with trading powers which 
maintain buffer stocks to stabilise prices; 
b) export monopoly boards, which may act as sole sellers 
or may appoint agents to sell overseas; 
c) domestic monopoly boards, which act as sole traders and 
processors, sometimes through agents. 
A tendency 
boards to take on 
usually weighted in 
has been noted (Izraeli & Zif, 1977) for advisory 
more executive functions. Board membership is 
favour of producers, who are elected rather than 
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appointed. There are some relatively unacceptable aspects to this. 
Rae (1978) pointed out the inappropriateness of a board whose 
membership is dominated by producers, deciding the level of transfer 
payments from consumers to producers. Legislative change is under way 
in Australia (Campbell, 1979) to limit the number and means of 
appointment of producers, to marketing boards, on the grounds that a 
producer does not necessarily have the training or the perspective 
appropriate to managing a marketing organisation. This is also 
recognised in the United States, where producers have appointed 
marketing specialists to administer a grain marketing pool, rather than 
administer it themselves. 
Recognition of the need for producer boards to enlarge their 
marketing, financial and managerial expertise has led to the 
restructuring of some Australian marketing boards as marketing 
corporations, strengthened by appointments from industry, and with 
extended trading powers. 
Marketing boards have tended to adopt strategies aimed at 
supply management as a means of enhancing and stabilising incomes, 
rather than by improving the operations of the market. Warley (1967) 
considers that market reform strategies appear unrewarding to producer 
organisations, partly because income-enhancing effects are likely to be 
small, and partly because most of the benefits derived from such 
reforms are distributed in favour of consumers rather than producers. 
Marketing boards also have the function of being a convenient mechanism 
for the administration of government price support schemes. 
10.1.2 Commodity Commissions 
* •• $ • 
Commodity commissions in the United Kingdom are a post~ar 
alternative to marketing boards. They are charged with identifying the 
needs of commodity groups for market reform encouraging co-operatives 
and marketing groups as the intruments of reform, and creating such 
special bodies as are necessary to carry out research, market reform 
and development for the industry as a whole. 
10.1.3 Marketing Orders and Agreements 
-. .... -.... 
Like marketing boards, marketing orders were originally 
established under enabling legislation passed in the 1930's to 
encourage economic recovery. A marketing order is a regulatory program 
issued by the United States Federal Secretary of Agriculture at the 
request of growers which legally obligates all commodity producers and 
handlers to abide by order terms. These typically involve commodity 
quantity and quality, packing standards, and conduct of research and 
market development projects. Volume management is implemented through 
producer allotment and market allocation plans, and market flows are 
regulated by reserve pools, shipping holidays and "pro-rates" 
limitations on the maximum volume a handler may ship over a stated 
period. 
Quality control provisions set minimum grade, size and maturity 
standards. Market support activities promote more orderly marketing 
and can include standardisation of packaging, and levying of fees on 
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handlers to finance research in production, marketing or advertising. 
Marketing orders are administered by a nominated committee of 
unsalaried grower and handler representatives, who recommend regulatory 
policy to the Secretary.of Agriculture. Herein lies the fundamental 
difference between a marketing board and a marketing order; while a 
board can have considerable executive powers, a marketing order 
functions as an advisory committee only; regulations are issued by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. 
A marketing agreement has essentially the same features as a 
marketing order~ except that conformity to the terms of a marketing 
agreement cannot be compelled. 
10 .. 2 Associative Arrangements of Producers 
• • ,.. PC , 
10.2.1 Producer Co-operatives 
". a 4 P 4 • UP 
The co-operative movement accounts for shares of produce 
markets in Europe and North America, ranging from 11 percent of the 
total agricultural market in the United Kingdom, where terminal markets 
are still the dominant form of disposal, to 80-90 percent of throughput 
in France, Denmark and Holland. Bateman (1979) examines some 
objectives for co-operatives, including maximisation of joint profit, 
producer surplus, membership, patronage refunds, throughput and net 
returns per unit. Non-maximising objectives include encouraging a 
spirit of self-help, enabling satisficing between price, dividend and 
capital accumulation, preventing oligopolistic or oligopsonistic 
exploitation and thereby minimising supernormal profits in the system, 
and providing a window on reality, to prove to members that 
exploitatiori is not occurring as they might suppose. Co-operatives, 
particularly primary level co-operatives, are democratically controlled 
by election of officers. As a consequence the quality of management, 
which is of central importance to the success or failure of a 
co-operative, can be uneven. 
In Europe, secondary and/or tertiary level co-operatives exist, 
particularly in those countries in which co-operatives have high market 
shares (Foxall, 1980). Tertiary co-operatives operate at national 
level, and exert strong, centralised management control over primary 
co-operatives, thus reducing competition, allowing integration and 
larger economies of scale, and reducing the democratic involvement of 
producers in decision-making. Foxall hypothesises that these types of 
market structure facilitate development and exercise of market power. 
They have strong marketing strategies and tend to become 
self-perpetuating corporate bodies. It is suggested that the absence 
of this type of structure in the United Kingdom accounts for the low 
co-operative market sharee 
Some disadvantages in the development of secondary and tertiary 
co-operatives 
autonomy and 
dilution of 
are noted by Kirk and Ellis (1969), including loss of 
immediacy of decision-making at first-tier level, and 
producer support. However, Foxall suggests that for 
co-operatives to advance the market. share of producers it is necessary 
for some form of oligopolistic marketing structure to exist. 
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10.2.2 Group Marketing 
• • 4 
Group marketing as described by Warley (1967) is characterised 
by associations of producers for the purpose of market improvement 
(which is not necessarily ·the objective of co-operatives), mostly by 
market-reform strategies. Groups create market power by efficient 
production, large-scale sale of products of appropriate quality, volume 
and continuity. Marketing groups tend to be strictly commercial, 
requiring capital contribution on entry, and operate as companies 
rather than friendly societies. 

SECTION 11 
ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF STATUTORY MARKETING AUTHORITIES 
It is generally agreed that the basic theoretical constructs to 
describe the activities of statutory marketing authorities in domestic 
and international commodity markets are inadquate. In addition, 
government policy actions are often based on ideological rather than 
economic principles, the economic consequences of which are seldom 
clearly identified. The cumulative effect of policy action on world 
markets in terms of trade barriers, cartels and~trictive agreements 
has caused increased reliance on government rather than on market 
forces, but there is a general lack of means to evaluate the effect of 
government action in terms of net welfare. Nevertheless, aspects of 
the performance of marketing authorities have been subject to scrutiny 
by various workers and some of their findings are discussed in this 
section. 
While producers' objectives of higher, stable prices and 
incomes may be achievable by the activities of producer organisations, 
government has a role in ensuring that national objectives are also 
met. Izraeli and Zif (1977) suggest that a marketing system in a 
complex economy needs to: 
a) allow for competition while 
aspects; 
minimising its dysfunctional 
b) provide better co-ordination of goals when the market mechanism 
is an insufficient guide; 
c) enable social objectives such as consumer 
environmental issues to be considered, without 
benefits from entrepreneurship and competition. 
interests, 
losing the 
Other works have re-stated these requirements such that the 
legitimate concern of government regarding marketing include enabling: 
a) the efficient allocation of resources (factors of production), 
b) the equitable distribution of the income thus generated, 
c) the efficient distribution of product. 
Performance of the food marketing (OECD, 1979) system should be 
measured by the same criteria as the economy as a whole. Therefore, 
policy makers need to establish the rules governing the price-formation 
process which will generate as nearly as possible the outcomes they 
prefer. Price efficiency in food marketing systems will clear the 
market in the short term, and in the long term will fully reflect 
consumer preferences and the costs of production. 
Some evaluations of the extent to which market organisations, 
in the pursuit of their own goals of price and income enhancement do or 
do not meet these requirements are outlined in the following 
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sub-section. 
11.1 Price and Income Enhancement, Stabilisation and Economic 
Er-ffirency G! P. - ........ • .. 
Q ...... 
A market is said to be price-efficient if price signals freely 
reach the producer. Unstable prices can distort these signals when 
fluctuations obscure a price trend, leading to resource misallocation. 
Rae (1976) notes that price stabilisation measures often aim to 
stabilise both price and incomes, but unless demand is relatively 
price-inelastic, this does not necessarily follow. Income 
stabilisation measures will also stabilise prices only if the demand 
curve for a product shifts over time, or if the demand curve is stable 
and inelastic, and the supply curve is shifted. If demand should be 
price-elastic, income stabilisation will destabilise prices. 
Conversely, price stabilisation measures will destabilise income under 
conditions of elastic demand. However, where price and income 
instability is due to large supply shifts, and the demand curve is 
nearly stationary and inelastic, guaranteed income schemes can achieve 
price and income stabilisation simultaneously. 
Administered pricing policies can therefore overcome problems 
of low or unstable prices under certain conditions, but various effects 
have been notede For example, Kortekaas (1978) in a study of control 
of price in the Dutch flower bulb market observed that while 
price-setting and production control had a beneficial effect on money 
turnover in the market, distorted incentives to production also occur. 
Production-encouraging effects also increased prices in the planting 
stock market, encouraged expansion of alternative crops with flow-on 
effects, and increased quality of remaining planting stock, with 
associated yield effects. 
Measures to increase efficiency within marketing channels as a 
means of enhancing producer incomes can be adopted. This can involve 
vertical integration to internalise profits within the channel, such as 
is practised by the NZ Dairy Board, or by fixing retail or wholesale 
margins. This approach has been followed by the NZ Apple and Pear 
Board but Rae notes that it reduced price competition among 
distributors. 
Quality assurance can have price-enhancing effects by setting 
minimum quality of product and presentation, and can also increase 
customer confidence. However, Jesse (1981) suggests that quality 
standards may impose supply restrictions to a degree, and reduc~ the 
choice available to consumers who may prefer to trade off price against 
out-of-specification product. 
The above two measures may both be employed without the 
necessity of supply management. While quality assurance may increase 
price there is an associated increase 1n quality and as market price is 
set by the level of import prices for that product, the price increase 
may not be great. Increasing market efficiency results in no price 
increase to consumers at all. Hill (1982) has observed that marketing 
authorities in Canada are not effective in increasing prices unless 
supply is also controlled. 
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Supply management can be applied in the short term to stabilise 
prices by product diversion or destruction, or in the long term to 
increase prices and incomes by production licences or quota systems. 
Supply control enables a marketing organisation to act like a 
monopolist in the market, and by driving the price up, to increase 
returns to the producer. Success in this does however depend on the 
consumption response to price for that product. There are also a 
number of problems associated with supply management. 
Because importers can also affect price 
the market place, supply-controlled products 
protection from import competition. This may 
political reasons. 
by their activities in 
automatically require 
be unacceptable for 
Unless participation by producers in the supply-controlling 
organisation is mandatory, there will always be "free-riders", 
producers who benefit from price effects without· accepting the 
discipline or contributing to the cost of the organisation. Blumencron 
and Alvensleben (1978) developed a model which demonstrated that most 
of the benefits from supply control will go to non-co-operators, unless 
the organisation controls a very large share of the market. Piggott 
(1981) similarly demonstrated that unless a supply-restricting cartel 
can provide greater average gains to co-operators, members will be 
encouraged to leave the cartel and it will fail. Gains from supply 
management are affected by price elasticity of demand - the lower the 
elasticity, the larger the total gain. Gains to co-operators and 
non-co-operators also depend on the supply elasticities faced by each 
group, but c~operator gains are negatively affected by non-co-operator 
supply elasticities while the reverse does not hold. Therefore, if 
supply management is to be contemplated, the organisation must be able 
to compel producers .• 
Where long-run supply management is applied, adjustments to 
productive capacity induced by distorted product prices can lead to 
misallocation of resources. Veeman (1982) suggests that the incentive 
to adopt cost-reducing technology is also diminished, and relatively 
inefficient producers are encouraged to remain in the industry. 
The most important criticism is that part of the supply 
management benefits are capitalised into quota values, which eventually 
are included in production cost formulas, thereby reducing consumer 
benefits for no gain. The cost to the consumer, as observed by 
Borcherding et a! (1981) in a discussion of the Canadian egg production 
system, can be considerable, although Rae demonstrated that the NZ 
Apple and Pear Board's supply restriction activities when compared to 
profit-maximising or competitive conditions have generated substantial 
increases in consumer surplus at the cost of a small reduction in 
actual over potential producer earnings. However, the general case is 
that producer benefits from long-term management have been achieved 
both at the expense of increases in consumer expenditure on reduced 
levels of consumption, and with substantia! losses in efficiency. 
Some success has been noted in measures to increase demand 
through market improvement strategies. The success of the NZ Dairy 
Board in new product and market development is an example of this. 
While marketing organisations have typic,ally experienced 
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positive results in terms of intergrating the activities of diverse 
farm and agri-business firms, in achieving economies of size, in 
implementing market information services and grading standards, and in 
achieving gains due to bargaining power, many such gains could be 
achieved with alternative marketing structures. 
11.2 Marketing Institutions and the Market Environment 
Q ; P' :,.. 24 
organisation is 
not all market 
Various workers 
each case before 
Where the establishment of a marketing 
contemplated, it is necessary to recognise that 
situations will respond postively to intervention. 
have stressed the need to study the key parameters in 
proceeding with such a course of action. 
The objectives of intervening in the marketplace will be known; 
what must also be answered are the questions: What mechanisms will 
achieve these objectives? How effective are they? What other effects 
are to be expected? 
The most appropriate type of market institution is also 
dictated by: 
a) The size of the market, and the proportion supplied by the 
proposed institution. 
b) The degree of consensus within the marketing channel. 
c) Price and income elasticities of demand in the market, and 
elasticity of supply_ 
d) The maturity of the industry or product. The appropriate form 
of an institution serving a given product can change over time. 
e) The nature of other participants in the market. 
The current operating efficiency of the market should also be 
considered. Warley has suggested that most agricultural markets enjoy 
a relatively high degree of price-efficiency already, and that the 
activities of market organisations may therefore gain little for the 
producer without some income transfers from consumers. Rae (1981) and 
Veeman (1982) both point out that where producers' individual income 
levels or stability is considered unacceptable, direct transfers via 
taxation and other policy measures can be a more equitable means of 
offsetting the problem than manipulating the market process. 
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